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THE FIFTH ABRAHAM L.
POMERANTZ LECTURE

THE NEW CORPORATE LAW
Joel Seligman*
INTRODUCTION

My thesis is a simple one. In the twentieth century state
corporate law norms for the large publicly held corporation
have been progressively supplanted by federal standards, particularly those originating in federal securities law. This has
occurred both because of the promulgation of new federal standards and because of the atrophy of state corporate law.
Certain applications of this thesis are little questioned
today. For instance, it is now a conventional idea that the state
law applicable to insider trading has largely been ignored and
has been generally displaced by such federal securities law
staples as Rule 10b-5,' section 16 of the Securities Exchange
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School. I would like to
express gratitude to Professors Al Conard, Merritt Fox, Harvey Goldschmid, and
Louis Loss, as well as Harold Marsh, Jr., for critically reading drafts of this essay.
This is an augmented version of a paper given as the Fifth Pomerantz
Lecture at Brooklyn Law School in March 1993 and retains the lecture style of
that presentation.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
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Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"),2 and Rule 14e-3 3 Similarly, it is
commonly understood that certain of the most fundamental
principles of corporate suffrage emanate from the federal proxy
rules, and not from state corporate law. 4 I want to urge, however, that the process of augmenting state corporate law fiduciary duty concepts with federal securities law disclosure standards and fraud cases is also quite advanced and, of late, has
been accelerating.
Let me illustrate the extent to which federal securities has
become "the new corporate law" by focusing on the two most
fundamental fiduciary duties, the duty of loyalty and the duty
of care. In doing so, I want to emphasize three implications of
this new corporate law. First, a transition from state fiduciary
duty concepts to this new corporate law portends a change in
the primary remedial theory of corporate law. Where state law
fiduciary duties essentially are grounded in a compensatory
purpose, the primary purpose of most Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") enforcement actions is deterrence. This
means, among other things, that the federal standards have
exploited the relatively greater flexibility of the administrative
process to employ a host of different types of interventions into
dysfunctional corporations such as cease and desist orders or
administrative proceedings against corporate attorneys or
accountants-interventions that are essentially unavailable in
state corporate law.
Second, as the transition is made from a focus on traditional corporate law duty of care concepts to a new corporate
law based on federal securities law, the significance of accounting and auditing to corporate governance becomes more evident. In the real world, the language of corporate governance
is accounting. Boards of directors are concerned with whether
they were adequately informed before making a decision. But
they express this concern in such terms as, "Do we have adequate internal controls?" or 'Was that process sufficiently audited?" Similarly, most corporations are managed by comparing

2

15 U.S.C. §

78

p (1988).

17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993). Compare 7 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3466-85 (1991) (state common law) with 7 id. at 34853545 and 8 id. 3547-70 (federal insider trading law).
4 See 4 id. at 1916-2119.
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actual performance to annual or more frequent internal operational budgets or business plans. These plans or budgets are
projections of future earnings and expenses. When a
corporation's performance is significantly short of the "plan,"
this usually is a signal or "red flag" for senior officers or the
board to investigate. The occasional state law duty of care
proceeding has largely been succeeded today by a host of federal securities proceedings against corporate issuers or their
accountants for deficient use of accounting standards in auditing procedures.
Third, and more broadly, the new corporate law has significant implications for the process of corporate governance.
While state corporate law interventions long have been largely
ex post fiduciary duty litigations against corporate officers and
directors, the emphasis of federal securities law reporting requirements is to prevent corporate dysfimction from occurring
by requiring compliance with detailed disclosure standards ex
ante.
While federal securities law has been the more dynamic
partner in the recent development of corporate law norms,
state corporate law today also retains a significant role. This
role is not confined to the residual function of developing the
nuts and bolts standards of corporate law, but on occasion has
also been dynamic and creative. What I urge is that the general tendency of corporate law development is progressively tilted toward federal norms, but this is a process not without
considerable backing and filling. There is no reason at this
time to assume that federal standards soon will totally preempt the corporate law field, even for the largest public corporations. In the concluding part of this Article I briefly discuss
the extent to which there may be today a case for the enactment of concurrent federal fiduciary duty standards.
I. THE DuTY OF LOYALTY
The duty of loyalty is the most important fiduciary duty of
corporate officers and directors. This duty requires that officers
and directors not profit at the expense of their corporation,
whether through self-dealing contracts, usurpation of corporate
opportunities, or other means. The duty applies also to parent
corporations in their treatment of subsidiaries in such transac-
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tions as mergers. The duty is applicable typically when a director, officer, or parent corporation has a conflict of interest; for
example, when influencing or potentially influencing both sides
in a contract negotiation.
In an often-cited article, Harold Marsh traced the loosening of legal restrictions on transactions involving conflicts of
interest. 5 In 1880 he wrote: "[Ilt could have been stated with
confidence that in the United States the general rule was that
any contract between a director and his corporation was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its shareholders,
without regard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction."6 Typical of decisions of this period was Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning Railway,' which termed this type of
limitation as "the great rule of law."' This prohibition was
grounded in concepts that today might be called "structural
bias."9 As the Maryland Supreme Court wrote in 1875 of the

'

Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate

Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966).
6 Id. at 36.
103 N.Y. 59 (1886).
8 Id. at 73.
9 For a description of possible structural bias when a board of directors' litigation committee recommends dismissal of a lawsuit brought against other members
of the board, see James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation'sVoice in Derivative
Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959,
962-63:
Commentators have explained in detail why the special litigation
committee's independence may be more apparent than real. Their concern
is founded on the observation that the defendants and the members of
the special litigation committee share a common cultural bond: directorship of a public corporation. The natural empathy and collegiality that
this bond engenders makes an adverse judgment of a colleague's behavior
distasteful at best. Also, when the committee is formed after the instigation of the derivative suit, the situation is rife with opportunities for the
defendants to select for committee membership those directors most sympathetic to their position. The committee's independence may be further
undermined by its members' desire to curry favor with their fellow directors or with the business community in general. Finally, special litigation committees operate under the constant threat of dissolution should
they displease the board by pursuing the plaintiffs cause with excessive
zeal.
The likelihood that these factors will corrupt the committee's independent judgment will be referred to as "structural bias."
Professor Cox amplified his argument in two subsequent articles, James D. Cox &
Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer

1993]

NEW CORPORATE LAW

inflexibility of this rule, when a contract was entered into with
even one director, "the remaining directors are placed in the
embarrassing and invidious position of having to pass upon,
scrutinize and check the transactions and accounts of one of
their own body, with whom they are associated on terms of
equality in the general management of all the affairs of the
corporation."0
Great or otherwise, this rule proved short lived. By 1910,
Marsh concluded
the general rule was that a contract between a director and his
corporation was valid if it was approved by a disinterested majority
of his fellow directors and was not found to be unfair or fraudulent
by the court if challenged; but that a contract in which a majority of
the board was interested was voidable at the instance of the corporation or
its shareholders without regard to any question of fair1
ness.
Marsh expressed some puzzlement for this abrupt shift in legal
philosophy: "[d]id the courts discover in the last quarter of the

Nineteenth Century that greed was no longer a factor in human conduct?"' The only explanation Marsh found in judicial
opinions for this change in position "was the technical one that
a trustee, while forbidden to deal with himself in connection
with the trust property, could deal directly with the cestui qui
trust if he made full disclosure and took no unfair advantage ... .13
I think one can go further and acknowledge that the absolute prohibition of the 1880 period was an unworkable rule, at
least for the publicly traded corporation. The notion, for example, that a competitor could acquire stock in a particular corporation and block its acquisition of a desirable patent from a
director-inventor--even at a fair price-would have required
the perpetuation of an excessively rigid standard. Nonetheless
there were some teeth in the 1910 approach. For the courts

1985); James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for
Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984); see also Hasan v.
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1984); Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716-18 (Iowa 1983).
Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 606 (1875).
" Marsh, supra note 5, at 39-40.
12 Id.
at 40.
13 Id.
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were willing in some instances to invalidate contracts when
less than a majority of the board voted for an interested transaction when it found that "[a] dominating influence may be
exerted in other ways than by a vote." 4
Even this limited willingness of the courts to invalidate
contracts when a majority of the board was interested in a
transaction dissipated over time. By 1960, in Marsh's view,
it could be said with some assurance that the general rule was that

no transaction of a corporation with any or all of its directors was
automatically voidable at the suit of a shareholder, whether there
was a disinterested majority of the board or not; but that the courts
would review such a contract and subject it to rigid and careful
scrutiny, and would invalidate the contract if it was found to be
unfair to the corporation.15

In retrospect, it seems clear that the most significant basis for
abandoning the principle of automatic invalidation of conflict of
interest transactions (at least those involving a majority of the
board) has been the adoption of so-called safe harbor statutes 6 by approximately forty-five states through 1992. These
statutes provide, in essence, that no contract or transaction between a director or officer and the corporation shall be void or
voidable solely because of this conflict of interest if there has
been disclosure of the relevant material facts to the board of
directors, a board committee, or the shareholders who approve
the transaction by the vote of a disinterested majority or the
contract or transaction is fair to the corporation. 7 Under this
type of statute in Delaware, approval of an interested transaction by a majority of disinterested directors or stockholders is
subject to review under the business judgment rule. 8

1

Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 489, 121 N.E.

378, 379-80 (1918).

Marsh, supra note 5, at 43.

14

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS §5.02, at 312-25 (Proposed Final Draft Mar. 31, 1992).
17 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1992) with AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 10, at § 5.02.
18 Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987); Citron v. E. I. Du

Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500-01 (Del. Ch. 1990); cf. Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (same rule for approval by disinterested
shareholder approval); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (disinterested director or shareholder approval shifts the burden of persuasion to the
person challenging the transaction).

1993]

NEW CORPORATE LAW

The practical significance of the decline of the duty of
loyalty between 1880 and 1960 was great. As Dennis Block,
Nancy Barton and Stephen Radin stated in The Business Judgment Rule,'9 there were five traditional aspects of the duty of
loyalty: "interested director transactions, usurpation of corporate opportunities, executive compensation, transactions between a dominating shareholder and the corporation and the
sale of control at a premium."" These authors concluded:
"The courts have utilized business judgment rule analysis to
one degree or another in connection with the first four of these
issues; the rule has no applicability with regard to the fifth."2 '
The difference between a duty of loyalty review of a transaction where the defendants have the burden of persuading a
court that the transaction was fair-that is, it would have been
approved by a disinterested board negotiating at arm's length
with a stranger 2 --and a business judgment rule analysis,
where the plaintiff must persuade the court that a director or
officer did not rationally believe that his or her business judgment was in the best interests of the corporation (a burden

19 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE: FIDuCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 49 (1988).
20 Id.
at 72.

Id. In 1990, after these words were written, one Delaware Chancery Court
opinion suggested that recent decisions may have backed away from applying the
business judgment rule in parent-subsidiary transactions. See Citron, 584 A.2d at
500 n.13.
See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11:
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the
most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of
a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts ....
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed,
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors,
and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial
21

considerations of the proposed [transaction], including all relevant factors .... However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as be-

tween fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined
as whole since the question is one of entire fairness.
An often-cited Delaware articulation of the business judgment rule appears
in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985):
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of
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requiring proof in Delaware of the equivalent to gross negligence),' is a fundamental one in corporate law. Directors and
officers very rarely lose lawsuits when they are subject to a
business judgment rule review. The odds are considerably less

favorable when directors or officers themselves must prove the
fairness of contracts or transactions they enter with their corporations.25
I want now to add two claims to this history: first, the
period after 1960 has seen a further decline in the state law
duty of loyalty because of both the frequent characterization of

tender offer defenses and other transactions as requiring a
business judgment, rather than a duty of loyalty, analysis and
the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del. C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its
board of directors. In carrying out their managerial roles, directors are
charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders. The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote
the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
directors. The rule itself "is a presumption that in making a business
decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company."... Thus, the party attacking a board decision
as uninformed must rebut the presumption that its business judgment
was an informed one.
The determination of whether a business judgment is an informed
one turns on whether the directors have informed themselves "prior to
making a business decision, of all material information reasonably
available to them."
Thus, a director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment is
in the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyaltYr . ..

.

The standard of care applicable to a director's duty of care has also
been recently restated by this Court. In Aronson [Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)]; we stated:
While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the
applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts
of gross negligence.
We again confirm that view. We think the concept of gross negligence is
also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment
reached by a board of directors was an informed one.
Id. at 872-73 (citations and footnote omitted).
24 Id. at 873.
' Cf. David S. Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law Professor's Status Report, 40
Bus. LAw. 1383 (1985), which besides discussing Marsh, id. at 1387-89, found
"remarkable uniformity," in the leading law school casebooks of the day in their
treatment of the duty of loyalty. Id. at 1384.
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the use of the litigation committee and kindred procedural
devices to resolve duty of loyalty and other cases without a
trial on the merits. Second, paradoxically, as the significance of
the state law duty of loyalty has declined, the deterrent force
of the duty of loyalty at the federal level has somewhat increased, largely because of the "new corporate law," which
effectively has transformed traditional state law doctrines such
as the duty of loyalty into federal securities law disclosure and
fraud concepts."
A. The FurtherDecline of the State Law Duty of Loyalty
One significance of the duty of loyalty safe harbor statutes
and related court decisions is that they provide a procedure by
which transactions which might otherwise be subject to state
law fairness review are instead less rigorously scrutinized
under the business judgment rule. For example, if a corporate
chief executive officer ("CEO") was a board member and the
full board were to approve his or her compensation, the CEO
might be involved in negotiating with himself or herself (as an
individual executive on the one hand and a board member on
the other), and be subject to a duty of loyalty requiring the
CEO to carry a burden of persuasion and prove that the compensation contract was fair to the corporation. If, however, all
of the directors delegate negotiation and approval of compensation contracts to a board committee on which the CEO does not
sit, and that committee is fully informed of all material facts,
the transaction is subject to the waste doctrine (an analogue of

' In making these claims I want to highlight two limitations to my analysis. I
have focused exclusively on publicly traded corporations, ignoring what I concede
are quite different recent developments concerning close corporations, see, e.g.,
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975),
and other nonpublicly traded firms. I have also largely focused my analysis of case
law on Delaware decisions, both because a substantial plurality of the nation's
largest corporations are incorporated there, see N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) (as of May
31, 1992, 843 of 1,816 domestic NYSE corporations (46 percent) were incorporated
in Delaware), and because Delaware has a more highly developed corporate law
case law than any other state. For example, in Michigan where I live, the courts
look to Delaware law when there is no Michigan corporate law opinion on point.
See, e.g., Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Gray v. Zondervan Corp., 712 F. Supp. 1275, 1280-81 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Priddy v.
Edelman, 679 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (E.D. Mich. 1988), affd, 883 F.2d 438 (6th Cir.
1989).
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the business judgment rule), which will only proscribe a contract in Delaware if the objecting shareholders convince the
court that "no person of ordinary, sound business judgment
would be expected to entertain the view that the consideration
was a fair exchange for the value which was given."27
This type of procedure gives a director or officer a choice.
If negotiation and approval of a contract or transaction is made
by an independent or disinterested committee that is fully
apprised of the material facts, then the courts generally will
defer to these procedural safeguards. One could debate
whether or not a board committee could be sufficiently independent in this context to justify business judgment rule review," but that is not my purpose here. Rather I want to
highlight the frequency since 1960 with which the courts in
Delaware and elsewhere have been willing to apply a business
judgment rule review to transactions when a board has not, at
least initially, adopted these types of procedural safeguards.
1.

Characterization of Tender Offer Defenses

When a board of directors is confronted with an unsolicited
tender offer, does the board have a conflict of interest if it
adopts a defense? In the abstract, this question may be viewed
as turning on whether or not a director's or officer's continued
employment, powers or perquisites within a corporation is
properly characterized as involving a sufficient personal benefit to justify the more rigorous fairness review of the duty of
loyalty. The law is unsettled here. Cases in New York,29 Cali-

Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962). The Chancery Court added:
Where waste of corporate assets is alleged, the court, notwithstanding independent stockholder ratification, must examine the facts of the
situation. Its examination, however, is limited solely to discovering
whether what the corporation has received is so inadequate in value that
no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth
what the corporation has paid. If it can be said that ordinary businessmen might differ on the sufficiency of the terms, then the court must
validate the transaction.
Id.; see also Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960).
Cf. supra note 9 (discussion of structural bias).
See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-67 (2d Cir.
1984) (New York law).
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fornia, ° Michigan31 and a distinct minority in Delaware32
have applied the duty of loyalty to tender offer defenses, but
usually under extreme circumstances. A few decisions from
various other jurisdictions review tender offer defenses by
applying the same business judgment rule that would be applicable to a decision to build a new plant unfettered by director
or manager self-interest.33
The dominant strain in recent cases, however, appears to
be a modified business judgment rule that developed in Delaware during the past thirty years. This is, in effect, a tripartite
standard. First, the burden of proof is placed on the board to
show reasonable ground to believe that a danger to corporate
policy or effectiveness is posed by a tender offer. "[D]irectors
satisfy their burden by showing good faith and reasonable
investigation; the directors will not be penalized for an honest
mistake of judgment, if the judgment appeared reasonable at
the time the decision was made."' Second, in 1985 the Delaware Supreme Court, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.,35 added a further aspect to the board's duty when exercising its power to forestall a takeover bid--"the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the
business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to

' Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 128, (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
("Once it is shown a director received a personal benefit from the transaction ...
the burden shifts to the director to demonstrate not only the transaction was
entered in good faith, but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of
the corporation . .
").
31 Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
32 In Delaware, when a board's primary purpose is to perpetuate its own control, a tender offer defense will be analyzed under the duty of loyalty. See, e.g.,
Mills Acquis. Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989) ("[J]udicial
reluctance to assess the merits of a business decision ends in the face of illicit
manipulation of a board's deliberative processes by self-interested corporate fiduciaries."); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 408 (Del. 1985).
' See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256-58 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
477 U.S. 903 (1986) (Ohio law); Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d
707, 719-24 (5th Cir. 1984) (Texas law); Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. &
Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984) (Illinois law); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
646 F.2d 271, 293-95 (7th Cir.) (Delaware law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701-03 (2d Cir. 1980) (New
York law); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (New
Jersey law).
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964).
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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the threat posed." 6 Third, the Delaware Supreme Court further held in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc. 7 that when the target is put up for sale, "[t]he directors'
role change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.""5 Any defense against a hostile
bid is "no longer a proper objective."39 A subsequent Delaware
Supreme Court decision has characterized violations of Revlon
as involving violations of both the duty of care and of the duty
of loyalty.'
Let me return to my initial question: Why isn't the retention of corporate positions, power, or perquisites deemed a
sufficient interest to justify a duty of loyalty analysis?4 There
is little question that an executive who causes the board to
offer him or her a desirable compensation arrangement would
be subject to a duty of loyalty analysis. Yet, in Delaware, if the
same executive causes a board to adopt a tender offer defense
that frustrates the offer, he or she will generally not be viewed
as subject to the same duty of loyalty analysis even though the
practical consequence of the defense may be to perpetuate
desirable compensation arrangements for the foreseeable future. Why not? A triad of Delaware cases, Kors v. Carey,42
Bennett v. Propp,4' and Cheff v. Mathes' addressed this
issue in the early 1960s.
In Kors, a 1960 opinion, the Chancery Court found the
personal interest of directors in voting for retention of their
offices insufficient "in overcoming the presumption that directors form their judgment in good faith."' Since this business
' Id. at 955; see AC Acquis. Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103
(Del. Ch. 1986); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate
Standards for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to ProportionalityReview?, 44

Bus. LAw. 247 (1989).
" 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
.3 Id. at 182.
3 Id.

Mills Acquis. Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 1988).
See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
42 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960).
'0
41

187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962).
- 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). The Delaware Supreme Court has continued to
rely on Kors, Bennett, and Cheff in share repurchase cases. See, e.g., Grobow v.
Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986).
' The relevant passage of the decision reads in toto:
43
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judgment rule presumption normally is not applicable when
there is a conflict of interest, this type of analysis appears to
have put "the cart before the horse."
It did not stand. Two years later the Delaware Supreme
Court in Bennett more aptly recognized:
We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of
shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy

when a threat to control is involved. The directors are of necessity
confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is
difficult .... Hence, in our opinion, the burden should be on the
directors to justify such a purchase as one primarily in the corporate
interest ....They sustained that burden in the Kors case; they
have not done so here.'

This language is considerably less generous than it may appear. It is true that the burden of persuasion is placed on the
board, as it would be in a typical duty of loyalty case. It is
further true that the court acknowledged that when directors
adopt a tender offer defense, they are "of necessity confronted
with a conflict of interest." But having said this, the court then
stopped short of imposing on directors the burden of persuasion to prove that the transaction is fair under the duty of
loyalty analysis. Instead, the directors are charged with the
considerably lesser burden of showing that the "purchase is

As to plaintiffs contentions that the Lehn & Fink directors were
selfishly voting for the retention of their offices and the emoluments
thereof, I conclude, having heard the testimony of the principals involved
and considered their personal evaluation of the dilemma posed by the
existence of a substantial block of their stock in the hands of United
Whelan, that plaintiff has not succeeded in overcoming the presumption
that directors form their judgment in good faith, Allaun v. Consolidated
Oil Co., 16 Del.Ch. 318, 147 A. 257. While it appears that the five active
members of Lehn & Fink's management currently receive salaries ranging
from sums in excess of $35,000 per annum to Mr. Edward Plaut's of
slightly more than $100,000 per year, that consultant directors receive
compensation ranging from $3,200 to $12,100 and that substantial legal
fees have been paid to lawyer-directors, I find no evidence that a selfish
desire to retain jobs on the part of the non-managerial Lehn & Fink
directors was a factor in their decision. Furthermore, assuming that Edward Plaut, who had most at stake in preserving the status quo at Lehn
& Fink, was strongly influenced by family considerations in reaching his
decision, nonetheless I am not persuaded that he so dominated the board
that its non-managerial members were unable to make their own decisions about the purchase under attack.
158 A.2d at 141-42.
4
187 A.2d at 409.
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one primarily in the corporate interest."47 This usually is not
difficult to demonstrate. The Delaware Supreme Court subsequently explained about the facts in Kors: "The evidence...
showed clearly that United wished to control Lehn & Fink in
order to force upon it a business policy that Lehn & Fink's
directors believed, on manifestly reasonable grounds, would be
quite injurious to their corporation."' This essentially reduces
the substantive test in Bennett to a business judgment rule,
albeit with the burden of persuasion on the board. Directors
can fail to carry that burden if they do not make an informed
judgment.49
In Cheff, Delaware's supreme court returned once more to
this question. After reaffirming the allocation of the burden of
persuasion to defendants, the court added:
To say that the burden of proof is upon the defendants is not to

indicate, however, that the directors have the same "self-dealing
interest" as is present, for example, when a director sells property to
the corporation. The only clear pecuniary interest shown on the
record was held by Mr. Cheff, as an executive of the corporation,
and Trenkamp, as its attorney. The mere fact that some of the other
directors were substantial shareholders does not create a personal
pecuniary interest in the decisions made by the board of directors,
since all shareholders would presumably share the benefit flowing to
the substantial shareholder. Accordingly, these directors other than
Trenkamp and Cheff, while called upon to justify their actions, will
not be held to the same standard of proof required of those directors
having personal and pecuniary interest in the transaction.'

This is both a sweeping and decisive rationalization of why
in Delaware the duty of loyalty normally does not apply to a
tender offer defense. The court, perhaps unreflectively, immediately subverts its own analysis by concluding: "[A] substan-

47 Id.

Id. at 408-09.
" The directors in Bennett "made no finding of immediate threat. They were
not even consulted." Id. at 409. For a later case with a similar holding, see, e.g.,
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967). But see Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
' Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964) (citation omitted); see also
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) ("Nor does
this become an interested director transaction merely because certain board members are large stockholders. As this Court has previously noted, that fact alone
does not create a disqualifying personal pecuniary interest to defeat the operation
of the business judgment rule. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d at 554.").
4
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tial block of stock will normally sell at a higher price than that
prevailing on the open market, the increment being attributable to a 'control premium."' 1 Why would an investor pay
more for a controlling block of stock than for a smaller lot if
control itself did not have value to the board members or others in control?52 The court simply ignored this question. But if
one plausible explanation is that control blocks sell for more
than smaller lots because of the value of the powers and perquisites associated with control to directors and officers, then
the court's assertion that "[t]he only pecuniary interest shown
on the record was held by Mr. Cheff, as an executive of the
corporation, and Trenkamp, as its attorney" 3 collapses. I submit that this non-analysis of the pivotal issue of whether or
not the duty of loyalty should apply to tender offer defenses is
equivalent to original sin. Once this omission occurs, much of
what follows is preordained.
In Cheff, for example, the Court soon reaffirmed that the
directors' burden is equivalent to the one imposed by business
judgment rule:
Id. at 555.
For elaborations on the current literature concerning the possible gains from
control, see, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 597, 606-13 (1989); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
891, 893-901 (1988) (analyzing alternative theories of why acquirers routinely pay
large premia over share prices for the assets of target firms); cf. LEwis D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 996 (2d
ed. 1988):
The controlling person is able to profit from a corporation in several
ways, some of which are unique to his controlling position. As an investor in the corporation the controlling stockholder is in the same boat as
all other investors, and will profit (or lose) proportionately the same as
all others do from the affairs of the company. Most important, he can
impose his will on the corporation to make the business decisions he
believes are best. But the controlling person can profit in other ways as
well. He can decide to hire himself and to pay himself a salary. The
controlling person can cause the corporation to buy and sell property to
himself. He can cause other transactions, in which he or favored friends
can profit. The controlling stockholder, in effect, has the keys to the
corporate treasury, and this is immense power which can be used properly or improperly. Of course, power and right are not always the same,
and the law can impose barriers to improper use and impose costs on
those who abuse their power, but these are not guarantees against abuse.
Some exercises of power will always occur in the seams of the zone between proper and improper conduct.
Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554-55.
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The question then presented is whether or not defendants satisfied
the burden of proof of showing reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed by the presence of
the Maremont stock ownership. It is important to remember that
the directors satisfy their burden by showing good faith and reasonable investigation; the directors will not be penalized for an honest
mistake of judgment, if the judgment appeared reasonable at the
time the decision was made.'

The directors satisfied the court "based upon direct investigation, receipt of professional advice, and personal observations
[of the bidder] ... that there was a reasonable threat to the

continued existence of [their corporation], or at least existence
in its present form.... ."' To put this another way, Cheff, in
effect, held that when directors make a reasonable investigation they can withdraw from shareholders the right to sell
their stock to an unsolicited bidder at a premium if they can
show a "threat" to corporate existence such as a bidder's insistence that the corporation eliminate its retail sales force."
The directors in essence are not charged with the burden of
proving that their sales policy is superior or fair, but merely
with demonstrating that after reasonable investigation the
unsolicited bidder's policy is different.
A practical consequence of this "threat" analysis is to drive
a wedge between the best interests of shareholders and of their
corporation. While it is typically difficult to see how a tender
offer with a premium on average approximately 50 percent
above the preexisting stock market price57 could "threaten"

" Id. at 555; see also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980)
(burden on plaintiff to show that sole or primary motive of directors was to retain
control), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
Cheff, 199 A.2d at 556.
Id.; cf. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 390 A.2d 556, 569 (Del. Ch. 1977). As Gilson
and Kraakman, supra note 36, at 249, put it: "Because competent counsel could
always document a policy conflict between a would-be acquirer and defending management, the Cheff test inevitably [was] reduced to a routine application of the
business judgment standard."
"' Both Kraakman, supra note 52, at 892, and Black, supra note 52, at 598,
601, cite 50 percent (or greater) as the average premium. This figure represents
successful tender offers and includes any prebid price run-up. See also Michael
Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division
between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 11
(1988); Debra K. Dennis & John J. McConnell, Corporate Mergers and Security
Returns, 16 J. FIN. EcoN. 143, 153-54 (1986); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S.
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shareholders, directors are given the alternative of arguing
that the tender offer "threatens" the corporation in some other
way. This challenges what long was an underlying premise of
corporate law. As the Michigan Supreme Court wrote in 1919
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,"5 "A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders."59 The Dodge approach does not distinguish between the
best interests of the corporation and those of its shareholders.
They are insoluble. They are one.
The implicit derogation of shareholder interests in Cheff,
in contrast, was made explicit in Unocal, the case that propounded the second aspect of Delaware's current business
judgment rule analysis of tender offer defenses. Unocal approved a selective self-tender offer by the target corporation to
all outstanding shareholders but the hostile bidder." After
affirming the applicability of Cheff to this type of selective
stock repurchase,"' the Delaware Supreme Court added:
A further aspect is the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it
must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This entails an
analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its
effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may
include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the
offer, questions of illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other
than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and
the quality of securities being offered in the exchange. While not a
controlling factor, it also seems to us that a board may reasonably
consider the basic stockholder interests at stake, including those of
short term speculators, whose actions may have fueled the coercive
aspect of the offer at the expense of the long term investor.'

Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN.
EcON. 5, 9-16 (1983); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990).

170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
19Id. at 684.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
6, Id. at 955.

' Id. at 955-56. Subsequent Delaware cases have relied on Unocal or both
Unocal and Cheff in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575
A.2d 1131, 114348 (Del. 1990) (tender offer settlement agreement); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-54 (Del. 1990) (merger
agreement); Mills Acquis. Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del.
1988) (asset lockup option); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d
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This language requires careful parsing. When one examines
the element of balance, one analyzes "the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise." No longer
is the inquiry the narrow one: will an offer primarily be for the
profit of stockholders. Now one can examine "the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)."' Moreover, "the basic stockholder interests at stake" can
be derogated by characterizing them in whole or in part as the
interests of "short term speculators, whose actions may have
fueled the coercive aspect of the offer at the expense of the
long-term investor."' If this language were to be construed
broadly, it would be revolutionary in its significance. No longer
would corporations be run primarily for the profit of their
shareholders. Now shareholders would be just another constituency, perhaps one subject to a special stigma as "short term
speculators," whose interests could be vitiated by taking into
account the impact of a tender offer on other constituencies,
such as the creditors, customers or employees mentioned in
Unocal.
There is good reason to doubt that the Delaware Supreme
Court intended so broad a reading. In Revlon, the same court
wrote:
The Revlon board argued that it acted in good faith in protecting the note holders because Unocal permits consideration of other
corporate constituencies. Although such considerations may be permissible, there are fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
1334, 1341-43, 1351-58 (Del. 1987) (declaration of special dividend and amendment
to standstill agreement); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (exchange offer for company stock); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350-51, 1354, 1356 (Del. 1985) (adoption of poison pill
or preferred share purchase rights plan); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp., Inc., 579 A.2d
1115, 1123-25 (Del. Ch. 1990) (delay of annual meeting); In re Holly Farms Corp.,
564 A.2d 342, 351-52 (Del. Ch. 1989) (redemption of poison pill); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 269-71 (Del. Ch. 1989) (validity of employee stock ownership plan); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,
659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (expansion of board); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd., Co. v. Pillsbury
AC Acquis.
Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1054-56 (Del. Ch. 1988) (retention of poison pill);
Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111-12 (Del. Ch. 1986) (stock
repurchase).
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
Id. at 956-57.
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responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern for non-stockholder
interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is
in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.'

On the other hand, still later the court in Paramount Commu-

nications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.6 6 again quoted the constituencies
passage from Unocal without adding the Revlon gloss.6 7 Thus,
the significance of the constituencies passage in Unocal remains somewhat uncertain.
Perhaps most significantly, however, through 1990 at least
twenty-five states had enacted "other constituency" statutes.6
This development, which in part can be traced to Unocal, led
the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws
to decline to adopt a similar revision to the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, because of what it termed a "potential for confusion:"
While legislatures may not have intended it, adding other constituencies provisions to state corporation laws may have ramifications that go far beyond a simple enumeration of the other interests
directors may recognize in discharging their duties. Directors might
have a duty to oppose a transaction with whatever means are available because it would have a demonstrably adverse impact upon one
or more of the constituencies (e.g., the acquirer plans to move the
headquarters from the small town in which the company had been
rooted for decades resulting in community disruption and loss of
jobs). Or directors might be called upon to decide how much of the
premium over market price being paid in an acceptable transaction
should be allocated among the various constituencies (e.g., how
much should accrue to communities in which plants might be closed;
how much should be allocated to the terminated hourly employees;
and how much should be allocated to a supplier who might lose his
market).
As was recently pointed out in the Columbia Business Law
Review, the reallocation of wealth is a function for which directors
are not especially suited and one beyond the general pale of their

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
' Id. at 1153; see also Mills Acquis. Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1282 n.29 (Del. 1989).
' ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253 (1990).
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perceived mandate from society. Such allocations of wealth (which
essentially a balancing of the interests of various constituencies
would be) are political decisions. Absent the vesting of enforceable
rights in those whose interests would have to be acknowledged,
directors would not be accountable for their conduct in preferring
the interests of one constituency over others.'

Make no mistake about it, boards of directors did not seek
to take into account other constituencies out of a new-found
enthusiasm to do something nice for their employees or surrounding communities. Their motivation, pure and simple, was
to adopt a new takeover defense that is applicable even when a
tender offer would be in the best interests of their shareholders. This, it seems to me, is the real problem with the constituency approach. It ultimately can unhinge directors from a duty
of loyalty to shareholders in one important context.
The Delaware Supreme Court has adopted one significant
limitation on this broadening of a board's discretion. In Revlon,
the court concluded when "the break-up of the company was
inevitable," ° the duty of the board changes
from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit.
This significantly altered the board's responsibilities under the
Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and
effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became moot.
The directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion
to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.'

This is an unvarnished application of the duty of loyalty. However the court subsequently construed this language stingily.
7
In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.," the Delaware Supreme Court held that the board's auctioneer duty
under Revlon applies only if it was inevitable that the target
would be sold.7' An increase in the holdings of the target's
largest stockholder, even to 49.7 percent of the outstanding
' Id. at 2269-70; see also James J. Hanks, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes; An Idea Whose Time Should Never Have Come, 3:3 INSIGiTS at 20 (1989).
173, 182 (Del.
70 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A2d

1986).
71

Id.

535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
73 Id. at 1345.
72
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shares, did not alone invoke the Revlon rule.74 Similarly in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,75 the court rejected the argument that Time was for sale when Warner
shareholders were to receive sixty-two percent of the combined
company after a merger.76 This decision, in effect, reduces
Revlon to a matter of form. Had Warner bought Time through
a tender offer, Revlon would apply. In contrast, when Warner's
former shareholders received a controlling interest in Time
after a merger, Revlon did not.
I contend that Delaware's corporate law would have been
far more defensible had tender offer defenses been analyzed in
terms of their fairness to shareholders under the duty of loyalty, rather than through consideration of such factors as different corporate policies or impacts on other constituencies. This
would not have foreclosed all defenses. For example, the same
court that in Unocal disparaged a tender offer as involving a
grossly inadequate price and a coercive two-tier bid" presumably would have found it fair for a board to interpose itself in a
selective self-tender offer. On the other hand, under a duty of
loyalty analysis it is very difficult to understand how a reasonable court could have supported Warner's offer in the Paramount case when Paramount's $200 all-cash offer represented
an increment of seventy-four dollars per share over where
Time's stock had traded before Paramount entered the scene,
unless the court had concluded that the Paramount offer was
not feasible or not serious."
The power of the board to adopt tender offer defenses
could have been limited to those instances in which the board
7' Id. at 1344-45.
75 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
' Id. at 1149-51; see also In re J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litig.,
542 A.2d 770, 781 (Del. Ch. 1988) (further limiting Revlon by requiring a finding
that the board appeared not to be acting in good faith for the shareholders' benefit).
" See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 945, 956 (Del. 1985).
7" Cf. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1147, 1149. In Paramount, the court notes that
Warner was to receive 7,080,016 shares (11.1%) of Time's outstanding common
stock. Id. at 1146. Extrapolating from this figure, Time had approximately
63,783,927 shares, which when multiplied by the $74 increment per share offered
by Paramount, deprived Time's shareholders of an aggregate premium of approximately $4.7 billion. Cf. also Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407-08
(Del. 1985) (holding that it was inequitable to fund ESOP shares after control had
already passed to another group).
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could carry the burden of showing that a tender offer was
"unfair." This could have been shown either in terms of "unfair
dealing," meaning the offer could be challenged because it was
not feasible or serious or unfair in some other sense, for example, that it involved a two-tier bid, 9 or that the offer was "unfair" or inadequate in price." This type of formulation would
have narrowed the permissibility of tender offer defenses in
two ways. First, a defense would have had to be adopted because of its fairness to shareholders rather than because of
broader corporate policies or corporate constituencies. Second,
presumably tender offer defenses would have had to have been
narrowed in a temporal sense as well. Given the specific shareholder interest involved, "pre-planned defensive mechanisms"
such as the poison pill could be more difficult to justify when
the terms of a potential tender offer were unknown."'
At the same time, it is important to note that, had Delaware and other state judiciaries so employed the duty of loyalty, they would have developed a mode of judicial review well
short of that advocated by certain commentators which would
have barred all or virtually all tender offer defenses, at least
when a tender offer had been initiated." Be that as it may,
the key point here is that Delaware and the considerable number of states that follow its corporate law court decisions decided instead to permit tender offer defenses broadly, applying a
modified business judgment standard. Whatever else one may
say about this line of analysis, there is no reasonable question
that it narrowed the applicability of the duty of loyalty in what
was the most significant category of corporate law decisions
during the last two decades.

7 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1357 & n.14 (Del. 1985).
'o This elaboration of unfairness was meant to parallel the one cited earlier in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
8' See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161,
1190-92 (1981).
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Derivative Action Litigation Committees

There is a second fundamental explanation for the decline
of the state corporate law duty of loyalty during the last thirty
years. In the last two decades or so there have evolved new
procedures for the termination of shareholder derivative actions against board members based on the recommendations of
other board members. To be sure, state courts long had been
willing to terminate derivative actions against outside parties
on the recommendation of a board, but rarely had they considered the legality of terminating derivative actions against some
board members on the basis of the recommendations of other
board members." Only after the questionable payment cases
of the 1970s' inspired a number of suits against board members did the judiciary focus on the propriety of terminating
actions against board members based on the recommendations
of what is usually called a litigation committee, comprised of
disinterested members of the board.
Judicial review of a litigation committee's recommendations has led to an unsettled body of law that is somewhat
reminiscent of that applicable to tender offer defenses.8 5 At
one extreme the New York Court of Appeals held in 1979 held
that if the members of a litigation committee are disinterested
and if the committee followed appropriate procedures, a court
should defer to the committee's business judgment and not
examine the substantive merits of its decision. 8 At the other
extreme the Iowa Supreme Court refused to permit directors
who were parties to a derivative action to appoint a litigation
committee for the purpose of recommending the dismissal of a
derivative lawsuit 7 because of the committee's structural bi-

' See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & David E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 261 (1981); Cox, supra note 9, at 963; George IV. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw.
U. L. REV. 96, 96-100, 105 (1980).
" See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND

EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND

MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE

534-51 (1982). See generally 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 24 n.62.

See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629-35, 393 N.E.2d 994, 999-1003, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-29 (1979).
b Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 715-16 (Iowa
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Again, Delaware has an influential and quite reticulate
middle ground.89 In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,90 then Justice Quillen, mindful that "'there but for the grace of God' go I
empathy"91 might influence directors on a litigation committee, established a two-step test for Delaware courts. First, the
trial court was required to "inquire into the independence and
good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions"92 when reviewing a litigation committee's recommendation to dismiss a derivative- action. There are a number of
possible outcomes of this first step:
If the Court determines either that the committee is not independent or has not shown reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the
Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including but not limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court
shall deny the corporation's motion. If, however, the Court is satisfied.., that the committee was independent and showed reasonable
bases for good faith findings and recommendations, the Court may
93
proceed, in its discretion, to the next step.

If the court does proceed to the second step, the court must
apply its own independent business judgment-and not defer
to the business judgment of the board committee-to determine whether the action should be dismissed.94
This means, of course, that instances could arise where a committee
can establish its independence and sound bases for its good faith
decisions and still have the corporation's motion denied. The second
step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet

1983); see also Alford v. Shaw, 324 S.E.2d 878, 886-87 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), modified, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987).
Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 716.
For example, §§ 7.03-.04, .07-.10, of the American Law Institute's Principles
of Corporate Governance, supra note 16, particularly emphasizes Delaware precedents. See also Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 57 (Mass. 1990) (the "emerging ALI
approach draws upon Zapata [v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981)] for its two").
step inquiry ..
' Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
9' Id. at 787.

Id. at 788. The Court further elaborated: "Limited discovery may be ordered
to facilitate such inquiries. The corporation should have the burden of proving
independence, good faith and a reasonable investigation, rather than presuming
independence, good faith and reasonableness." Id.
3 Id. at 789. See also Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985).
Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789.
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the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its
spirit, or where corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration in
the corporation's interest.'

When Justice Quillen wrote these words, he added in a
footnote: "Our approach here is analogous to and consistent
with the Delaware approach to 'interested director' transactions, where the directors, once the transaction is attacked,
have the burden of establishing its 'intrinsic fairness' to a
court's careful scrutiny."'
Delaware subsequently proceeded with a somewhat less
generous spirit. In Aronson v. Lewis97 Delaware's supreme
court no longer concerned itself with the dilemma of the director asked to sue other directors and "'there but for the grace of
God' go I empathy.""8 Instead the court emphasized, "[b]y its
very nature the derivative action impinges on the managerial
freedom of directors."' No longer were there footnotes comparing judicial review in demand excused cases to "the Delaware approach to 'interested director' transactions.""° Now
the text thundered: "In our view the entire question of demand
futility is inextricably bound to issues of business judgment
and the standards of that doctrine's applicability."'0 ' And,
while Aronson took some pains to emphasize that "the business
judgment rule has no application in determining demand futility,"1o2 the court strikingly declared that when the business
judgment rule was applicable, it would from now on be based
on "concepts of gross [not simple] negligence." 3
When, then, should a court conclude that demand was

9 Id.

Id. at 788 n.17. Former Justice Quillen now characterizes the Zapata special
litigation procedure as a "discarded procedure," implicitly acknowledging the significance of the increased use of the demand requirement to dismiss claims. See
William T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship-A Response to
Professor Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate FiduciaryLaw,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 107, 121-24 (1993).
9' 473 A.2d 805, 805 (Del. 1984).
98 See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787.

9Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.

Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788, n.17.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
102 Id.
10

101

103

Id.
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futile and that a board was required to follow Zapata procedures to cause a derivative suit's dismissal? The Aronson court
explained:
Our view is that in determining demand futility the Court of
Chancery in the proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is
created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and
(2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment.'

The Aronson court provided further interpretative guidance to this standard. The reasonable "doubt" in its standard
was meant to be more difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy than
the reasonable "inferences" test earlier applied in the case by
the chancery court. As the supreme court stated:
The problem with this formulation is the concept of reasonable
inferences to be drawn against a board of directors based on allegations in a complaint. As is clear from this case, and the conclusory
allegations upon which the Vice Chancellor relied, demand futility
becomes virtually automatic under such a test. Bearing in mind the
believe that
presumptions with which director action is cloaked, we 105
the matter must be approached in a more balanced way.

It was insufficient for the plaintiff to ask the court to infer that
Fink, the recipient of a challenged employment agreement
dominated and controlled the Meyers Parking System's
("Meyers") board based on "(1) Fink's 47% ownership of
Meyers' outstanding stock, and (2) [the fact] that he 'personally
selected' each Meyers director. Plaintiff also alleges that mere
illustrates Fink's domiapproval of the employment agreement
10 6
nation and control of the board."
The burden on plaintiffs was not merely to provide facts
from which a court could make a reasonable inference, but
rather the higher threshold, a reasonable doubt. Here, the
court explained, plaintiff's "contentions do not support any
claim under Delaware law that these directors lack
independence."0 7 Why? Because, the court added:
104Id. at 814.
105 Id.

Id. at 815; cf. Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc. 2d 853, 857, 583 N.Y.S.2d
340, 343-44 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992) (special litigation committee lacked required disinterestedness).
10 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
106
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[In the demand context even proof of majority ownership of a company does not strip the directors of the presumptions of independence, and that their acts have been taken in good faith and in the
best interests of the corporation. There must be coupled with the
allegation of control such facts as would demonstrate that through
personal or other relationships the directors are beholden to the
controlling person.
We conclude that in the demand-futile context a plaintiff
charging domination and control of one or more directors must allege particularized facts manifesting "a direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the
corporation (or persons) doing the controlling". The shorthand shibboleth of "dominated and controlled directors" is insufficient.
Here, plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to support a
claim of control. The personal-selection-of-directors allegation stands
alone, unsupported. At best it is a conclusion devoid of factual support. The causal link between Fink's control and approval of the
employment agreement is alluded to, but nowhere specified. The
director's approval, alone, does not establish control, even in the face
of Fink's 47% stock ownership.10 8

Appreciate that this burden is imposed on the plaintiff
before discovery." 9 Delaware places the plaintiff in a quandary. Unless the plaintiff, without the aid of deposition or interrogatory, can allege sufficiently specific facts to persuade a
trial court that demand is futile, the board can treat dismissal
of the lawsuit as just another business decision. If, however,
the plaintiff does succeed in alleging sufficiently specific facts
to persuade the court that demand is futile, then the board can
appoint a disinterested litigation committee and seek dismissal
under the Zapata procedure. Aronson threw plaintiffs one
small bone. The court stressed: "ITIhe plaintiff need only allege

ICBId. at 815-16 (citations omitted). For subsequent applications of the Aronson
approach, see Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773-74 (Del. 1990); Grobow v.
Perot, 539 A-2d 180, 183, 186-89 (Del. 1988) ("Unless the presumption of the business judgment rule is overcome by the pleadings, questions of fairness play no
part in the analysis"); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624-25 (Del. 1984); cf.
Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 731-32 (Del. 1988)
(corporation's failure to object to shareholder derivative suit is viewed as approval
of the suit).
" See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 209 (Del. 1991) ("The rationale for allowing discovery in a demand excused-Zapata context has no application in the case
of either demand refused or demand excused, absent the Zapata context.").
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specific facts; he need not plead evidence.""0 The same court
subsequently narrowed even, this point when, in Levine v.
Smith,"' it held that the plaintiff's pleading under Delaware
Chancery Court's Rule 23.1 burden is "more onerous" than that
required to withstand a motion to dismiss."' The text of the
decision then quoted with approval Allison ex rel. General
Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.:" "Rule 23.1 is a
marked departure from the 'notice' pleading philosophy governing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.""'
Where does this leave a plaintiff with a meritorious claim?
He or she faces an imposing gauntlet of procedural hurdles
before being allowed to litigate on the merits: First, the plaintiff initially must plead, absent any discovery, that a majority
of the board "either has a financial interest in the challenged
transaction or lacks independence or otherwise failed to exercise due care.""5 Alternatively, if the plaintiff cannot prove
that a majority of the board is interested or otherwise incapable of exercising independent business judgment, the plaintiff
must plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt
concerning the "soundness" of the challenged transaction sufficient to rebut the presumption that the business judgment rule
473 A.2d at 816. Even at the time this may have been less
charming to plaintiffs than the quoted sentence suggests, for the next sentence
reads: "Otherwise he would be forced to make allegations which may not comport
with his duties under Chancery Rule 11." Id.
110 Aronson,

' 591 A.2d at 194.
iu Id. at 207.

604 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Del.), affd mem., 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985).
A.2d at 207 (quoting General Motors, 604 F. Supp. at 1112). The Court
also noted: "Allison cannot be fairly read as intending any departure from
Aronson's and Grobow Is requirement of well-pleaded allegations of fact which
create a reasonable doubt that a board of directors' decision is protected by the
business judgment rule." Id. at 211.
But this creates a peculiar difficulty for the plaintiff. As Judge Easterbrook
explained:
The amount of information in the public domain is unrelated to the ability of the board to make a business judgment concerning litigation, is
unrelated indeed to any function of the demand requirement. Why should
the board acquire the power to dismiss under Zapata just because the
plaintiff needs discovery and so cannot make the required showing "with
particularity" in the complaint? Aronson and its successors do not discuss
the point.
Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1176 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
1

114 591

"'

Levine, 591 A.2d at 205.
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attaches to the transaction." 6 Under either test, the
plaintiffs pleading burden is "more onerous" than that required to withstand a motion to dismiss or notice pleading
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 7 The plaintiff
ultimately has to plead sufficiently specific evidence to persuade the trial court not merely that it is reasonable to infer
that the directors are not disinterested and independent or
that the transaction is not the product of a valid business judgment, but rather that the higher threshold of a reasonable
doubt regarding one of these two standards can be alleged."'
Second, the defendant can challenge plaintiffs assertion
that demand is futile. If the court agrees with the defendant
that demand is required, the board of directors or all disinterested members usually will reject demand. The plaintiff then
may challenge that decision as not protected by the business
judgment rule. Given the fact that the plaintiffs have historically succeeded in challenging decisions as not protected by the
business judgment rule in such a small number of cases, it
seems reasonable to assume that the plaintiff will normally
lose this type of lawsuit.
Third, if, on the other hand, the court concludes that demand is excused, the corporation's board of directors then may
appoint an independent litigation committee to investigate the
plaintiffs allegations, prepare a thorough written report, and
almost invariably seek dismissal of the derivative action."
Under Zapata,n ° "[e]ach side (and as to the motion this
means the plaintiff on the one hand and the corporation
through its representative, the Special Litigation Commit-

...Id. at 205-06.
17 Id. at 204; see Allison ex rel. General Motors v. General Motors, 604 F.
Supp. 1106, 1112 (D. Del.), affd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985).
"' Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-16 (Del. 1984).
.. See Cox, supra note 9, at 963: "Whatever one's view about the impact of the
factors that feed a committee's structural bias, the committee's record is itself
disquieting; although there have been more than a score of special litigation committee cases to date, in all but one the committee concluded that the suit in question was not in the corporation's best interest." Professor DeMott similarly cites
only one case in which a litigation committee recommended that the corporation
sue a former officer, Kaplan v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 529 A.2d 254, 256

(Del. Ch. 1987). See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS:

LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:19 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
'2 Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 K2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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tee-and not the other defendants-on the other) shall have an
opportunity to make a record on the motion."'21 At this point
there may be discovery, at the discretion of the court, limited
to issues related to the good faith and independence of the
litigation committee and the bases supporting its conclusions.122
Fourth, as Chancellor Brown explained in Kaplan v.
Wyatt:
If, after the motion has been argued or submitted for decision,
the Court
(1) is satisfied on the record presented by the motion that
there is a genuine issue as to one or more material facts, or
(2) determines on the undisputed material facts that the Committee is not independent, or
(3) determines on the undisputed material facts that the Committee has not shown reasonable bases for its conclusions, or
(4) is not satisfied on the undisputed material facts that the
Committee has acted in good faith, or
(5) is satisfied for other reasons relating to the investigative
process engaged in by the Committee that it has failed to carry
its burden of proving its independence, good faith and a reasonable basis for its recommendation, then the Court shall
deny the motion for such reason and need go no farther, the
result being that the shareholder plaintiff may resume immediate control of the litigation with a view toward prosecuting it
to a conclusion regardless of the position taken by the special
investigating committee appointed by the corporation's board
of directors." 4

Chancellor Brown did not analyze whether the court could
remand the matter to the litigation committee to allow it to
supplement its report. On the other hand, he continued:
If, however, after the motion has been argued or submitted for
decision, the Court
(1) is satisfied that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact presented by the record made on the motion, and
(2) is further satisfied on the undisputed facts of record pertaining to the motion that the Committee is independent of the
corporation's board of directors, that it has made a reasonable

Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. Ch. 1984), affd, 499 A.2d 1184
(Del. 1985).
122

Id.

12 Id.
124

Id.

at 508.
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investigation and has shown reasonable bases for its findings
and recommendations, and that they were made in good faith,
then the Court may do either of two things, namely, (1) grant
the motion, order a dismissal of the suit and end the litigation,
or (2) in its discretion, proceed to the second-step analysis [of
whether in the Court's own business judgment the action is in
the corporation's best interest] before rendering a decision on
the motion.'

All this in Chancellor Brown's pungent phrase was a "legal
mouthful... fraught with practical complications at the trial
court level. " "6 A plaintiff in a demand excused case may
have had to proceed through four separate hearings concerning: (1) whether demand was, in fact, excused-the result of
this hearing can be appealed; (2) a hearing to determine
whether a stay should be granted to stop the plaintiffs discovery until the litigation committee has reported;' 27 (3) a hearing to determine the extent, if any, of plaintiffs limited discovery after the litigation committee has filed its report; 28 and
(4) a hearing on the litigation committee's motion to dismiss
the suit.'29 In Kaplan, where only the last three of these
hearings occurred, Chancellor Brown explained: "[W]e are
some three years after the amended complaint was
filed ....
Chancellor Brown, however, was an optimist. Some fifteen
months transpired between the time the litigation committee
submitted its motion to the Delaware Chancery Court and the
Delaware Supreme Court issued its opinion on the appeal of
Chancellor Brown's order granting that motion.'3 ' Had the
plaintiff prevailed before the supreme court, only then-more
than four years after the initial complaint was filed-would the
plaintiff have been allowed to proceed to discovery, motion

125 Id.
'2

Id. at 509.

Chancellor Brown believed: "It is a foregone conclusion that such a stay
must be granted. Otherwise, the entire rationale of Zapata, i.e., the inherent right
of the board of directors to control and look to the well-being of the corporation in
the first instance, collapses." Id. at 510.
12 Id. at 510-11.
1"7

12

Id. at 511.

12$ Id.
'3, Compare id. at 501 (action submitted July 6, 1984) with 499 A.2d 1184
(Supreme Court action decided October 9, 1985).
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practice, and potentially a trial on the merits.
It seems to me there are two aspects of this protracted
procedure that particularly deserve comment. First, my underlying assumption that the plaintiff might have a meritorious
case could be rejected as being always or nearly always wrong.
The expensive and time consuming litigation committee process could be rationalized as a type of legal realist response to
systematically bad cases. To suggest one basis for this type of
argument, my gifted colleague, Jack Coffee, is hardly alone in
suggesting that at times the plaintiff (or, more accurately, the
plaintiffs attorney) may be an "unfaithful champion" in shareholder litigation, more interested in attorneys fees than corporate recoveries.' 32 I am skeptical that focus on the motivation
of plaintiffs' attorneys takes us very far. Since the time of
Adam Smith, after all, a glory of capitalism has been that
"private vice makes public virtue."'3 3 If the self-interest of
plaintiffs' attorneys leads to deterrence of officer and director
misconduct, this should be seen as a benefit, not a bane.
Whether or not the cases themselves are meritorious,
however, is a question that can be analyzed. But here the data
are enigmatic. In one eight-year study of 531 derivative and
class action lawsuits brought against officers and directors
between 1971 and 1978, plaintiffs obtained some form of relief
75.3 percent of the time. However plaintiffs won a litigated
judgment less than one percent of the time; and, since the
study did not collect data concerning the size or adequacy of
the settlement funds, it is uncertain how often, if at all,
plaintiffs' recoveries were because of the merits of the lawsuits,
3
or simply to avoid more expensive litigation. 1
A second study conducted by Professor Roberta Romano
examined a random sample of 535 public corporations between
the late 1960s and 1987. Here too there was a strikingly high
rate of settlement. Some sixty-five percent (eighty-three of the
128 claims resolved during this period) were settled. In approximately fifty-five percent of the settled claims (forty-six out of

"' John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Summer 1985).
133 See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
134 Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542, 544-47 (1980).
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eighty-three), there was a monetary recovery with an average
recovery of nine million dollars in the thirty-nine cases where
5
the settlement fund could be valued." From these data, it is
again difficult to infer how often meritorious claims were settled and how often settlements were simply to relieve the corporation of the "nuisance" of unwarranted potential trial costs.
However, one aspect of Romano's data is intriguing:
Settlement funds vary substantially by type of action. The average
recovery in derivative suits ($6 million) is about half that in class
actions ($11 million). As a percentage of firm assets it is also much
less (0.5 percent compared to 1.6 percent). The proportion of derivative suits with a cash payout to shareholders (21 percent) is signifi136
cantly lower than that of class actions (67 percent).

These data, although based on relatively small samples (twelve
3 7 suggest
derivative suits and twenty-nine class actions),

that one possible consequence of the increased time and ex- f

pense of the derivative claim is to reduce the frequency with
which this type of litigation deters managerial misconduct. But
one cannot be particularly confident about that inference. A-

substantial proportion of the derivative claims, but a lesser
proportion of securities class actions, resulted in structural
modifications to the board, executive compensation, tender
offer defenses, self-interested transactions and the like, but no
monetary relief.'38 Hence the lower frequency of monetary
relief in derivative claims may merely reflect the greater likeli' Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 58-61 (1991); cf. Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?
A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 500
(1991) (finding, based on a very small sample, that securities class actions tend to
settle at 25% of the asserted potential damages). Professor Romano added:
This aspect of shareholder litigation is unremarkable; most civil suits
settle. In fact, with powerful incentives to settle from the structure of
indemnification rights and insurance coverage, it is, perhaps, surprising
that one-third of the suits did: not settle. Shareholder-plaintiffs, however,
have abysmal success in court. Only one suit had a judgment for the
plaintiff (upholding some of the plaintiffs claims in a ruling on stipulated
facts), and in one other suit a state supreme court reinstated a complaint
that had been dismissed by the trial court. This is a success rate of 6
percent of adjudicated cases, but plaintiffs actually won no judgments for
damages or equitable relief.
Romano, supra, at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 61 n.12.
138 Id.

at 63-65.
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hood of nonmonetary relief.
A better question can be posed. If one assumes, arguendo,
that a substantial proportion of plaintiffs' derivative claims are
nonmeritorious, how does the new litigation committee procedure facilitate earlier and less expensive resolution of these
claims than the alternatives of pretrial motions to dismiss and
sanctions for nonmeritorious claims through state law equivalents to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11? True, the litigation
committee procedure does long tend to prevent plaintiffs from
discovery, which makes it difficult to analyze the merits of
their claims; but one is hard pressed to see any other advantage of the litigation committee procedure over the conventional judicial tools for disposing of nonmeritorious lawsuits. And,
even if advantages can be theorized, they merely press us
toward the ultimate question: at what cost? For the available
data suggest that the increased expense in time and money to
plaintiffs of the litigation committee may tend indiscriminately
to discourage both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims.
There is a second aspect of the Delaware variant of the
litigation committee procedure that also deserves comment.
Both the theory'39 and the litigated cases 4 make it clear
that it is more difficult to dismiss a duty of loyalty claim on
the ground that demand is required. By definition, a duty of
loyalty claim concerns a decision that is not "the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment."' But this highlights a
more fundamental issue. If a plaintiff, absent any discovery, is

13, See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
'
See, e.g., Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950 (Del. 1992) (waste and
self-dealing); Kells-Murphy v. McNiff, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 127 (Del. Ch. July 12,
1991) (self-dealing); Strougo v. Carroll, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH)
95,815 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1991) (insider trading); Thorpe v. Cerbco,
Inc., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,416 (Del. Ch. Nov.
15, 1991) (diversion of a corporate opportunity to sell a subsidiary); Manchester v.
Narragansett Capital, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 141 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1989)
(waste and duty of loyalty); L.A. Partners, L.P. v. Allegis Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,505 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 1987) (entrenchment motive underlay tender offer defensive measures); see also Merritt v. Colonial
Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757 (Del. Ch. 1986) (challenged cash-out merger constituted
a breach of the duty of loyalty because it was effectuated to preclude plaintiffs
litigating self-dealing claims); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985) (rejecting litigation committee recommendation to dismiss corporate opportunity

claim).
..
1 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
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capable of raising a reasonable doubt that demand is futile
either because of a persuasive pleading of an underlying duty
of loyalty violation or a disabling conflict of interest on the
board, why should that plaintiff then be subject to a subsequent protracted delay while a litigation committee investigates the complaint, files and then defends a report? Duty of
loyalty claims, after all, are the most serious allegation of state
corporate law misconduct. They involve taking advantage of
shareholders through such means as self-dealing or usurpation
of corporate opportunities. Yet it is almost inevitable that the
committee will recommend dismissal of the these
litigation
14 2
claims.

An underlying problem with the litigation committee procedure has been the judiciary's indifference to the psychological
realities of a litigation committee investigation. I assume no
bad faith on the part of either the committee or the attorneys
who typically conduct the investigation. But even absent any
bad faith, there are none of the devices in a litigation committee investigation that are found in more conventional litigation
to fortify the investigator's skepticism or, to use perhaps a
better phrase, appropriate agnosticism. Unlike a trial or deposition setting, no opposing counsel is present to conduct a hostile cross-examination or to interpose a timely objection. The
investigator, when witnesses are not under oath, has no real
ability effectively to remind a witness of the penalties for perjury. Furthermore, while an investigator can reach conclusions
about the likelihood that a witness will appear persuasive to a
jury or other fact finder, this type of conclusion arguably has
little place in a final report. In sum, the very nature of the
is biased in favor of not finding fault or of minimizproceeding
143
ing fault.
Whatever the merits of the Zapata procedure in corporate
governance theory may be, it simply has not provided a fair or
balanced procedure in fact. Besides Chancellor Brown's critique of the added time and expense of this procedure,' it is
2

See Cox, supra note 9, at 63.

"
For a more detailed elaboration of this theme, see Joel Seligman, The Disinterested Person: An Alternative Approach to Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 55
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357 (Autumn 1992).

'" See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508-11 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d
1184 (Del. 1985).
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worth observing that as much as seventy-one percent of a
recent random sample of settlements of shareholder claims
have apparently been litigated under the federal securities
laws, not state corporate law. This result, in part, appears to
reflect the reality that state corporate law has become a less
effective means of protecting shareholder interests.4 " This
would appear to be a particularly regrettable development with
respect to duty of loyalty cases.
C. FederalSecuritiesLaw
Now let me suggest that matters are not quite so bleak as
the analysis to this point might suggest. At approximately the
same time that state corporate law has receded in the duty of
loyalty area, federal securities law-the new corporate
law-has emerged. Again let me take as a baseline Harold
Marsh's article.' While his analysis of the evolution at the
state level of the law of conflicts of interest has been often
cited, his article also included a brief discussion of three federal securities law approaches to conflicts of interest: (1) the
SEC's executive compensation requirements;'47 (2) its administrative approval of certain investment company conflicts of
interest under section 17(a) of the Investment Company
Act;148 and (3) discussion of one administrative action
1" The sample size, however, is small: 41 lawsuits (of which 29 were class
actions) and 12 derivative suits. Romano, supra note 135, at 61 n.12.
In a letter dated December 29, 1992, Professor Romano provided additional
data indicating that, of the total of 128 claims studied in her study,
Settled
Dismissed
Class Action
30
8
Derivative Action
33
17
Both Class and Derivative
18
13
Individual Shareholder
2
7
Letter from Roberta Romano, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to Joel Seligman,
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (Dec. 29, 1992) (on file with
author).
14 See generally Marsh, supra note 5, at 35.
17 Id. at 50-51; see also id. at 65-67, 70-71. These requirements are now reflected in Regulation S-K Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1993). See 2 LoSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 675-78.
"

15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1988). Marsh, supra note 5, at 51-53; see also id. at

65, 67, 71 (discussion of affiliated person under the Investment Company Act).
Regarding § 17 of the Investment Company Act, see generally 2 TAMAR FRANKEL,
THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS; THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND THE
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brought by the Commission that proscribed a controlling
shareholder's self-dealing transactions with a publicly held
corporation.'49 Marsh concluded his article with a tone of
frustration and a legislative proposal:
It should be apparent that the current rules do little or nothing
to inhibit conflicts of interests with respect to corporations generally,
and that they correct any overreaching which may occur only in a
haphazard fashion in a small minority of cases. However, we deferred above consideration of the effect of requiring prior administrative approval of such transactions, as exemplified in the Investment Company Act of 1940.
A consideration of the history of the investment company industry before and after 1940 should convince anyone that this requirement has been an outstanding success. Prior to that date investment companies furnished the most flagrant examples of fraud
and overreaching as detailed in the monumental study of the Securities and Exchange Commission which led to the enactment of the
1940 Act. Since that date, with respect to transactions covered by
Section 17 these practices have virtually disappeared. The current
controversy in the investment company field is concerned entirely
with the relationship of investment companies with their investment
advisers and underwriters, a relationship not subjected to the treatment accorded other conflict of interest situations in Section 17.
On the other hand, legitimate and beneficial transactions have
been granted approval. Therefore, the argument against absolute
prohibition, that in many cases it is to the advantage of a corporation to have a transaction with an officer, director or other related
person, does not apply to this type of regulation.15

Marsh then proposed the enactment of a general conflict of
interest provision as a new section of the 1934 Act.' 5 ' As with
section 17 of the Investment Company Act,'52 Marsh's proposed new section would allow the Commission, on application,
to exempt a proposed conflict of interest transaction if the
agency found that: "(i) the terms of the proposed transaction,
including the consideration to be paid or received, are reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching on the part of

INVESTMENT ADVISERS AcT

408-606 (1978 & Supp. 1991).

" The action was the well-known case of In re Franchard Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,113 (July
31, 1964). See Marsh, supra note 5, at 53-54.
See Marsh, supra note 5, at 73-74.
1 Id. at 74-76.
12 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1988).
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any person concerned; and (ii) the proposed transaction is
consistent with the purposes of this Section and the protection
of investors."'53 While the late Commission Chairman William Cary,' among others, 5 later made proposals for federal conflict of interest or fairness standards, no general provision along these lines has been adopted at the federal level.
Nonetheless, the Commission and the courts have taken substantial, albeit partial, steps to address duty of loyalty problems through mandatory disclosure standards and in litigated
cases. Let me offer several examples, ignoring such special
cases as section 17 of the Investment Company Act or issues
concerning accountants' independence. 5
1.

Disclosure Requirements

There was more that Marsh could have addressed. Building on the Brandeisian premise, "[s]unlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman," 57 considerable anecdotal evidence was developed during the course of the 1931-32 Senate Foreign Bond 58 and
1932-34 Pecora Hearings'59 that preceded enactment of the

'"

See Marsh, supra note 5, at 75 (Proposed § (c)).

15

William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,

83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
See, e.g., SEC, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: A REEXAMINATION OF RULES RELATING TO SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE CORPORATE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
GENERALLY, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG.,
2D SESS. 98-127 (Comm. Print 1980) (history of federal corporate law proposals);
see also Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards,
49 MD.L. REv. 947, 971-74 (1990).
15 See, e.g., 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at
726-42.
,67Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND How THE BANKER'S USE
62 (1914).
'" The Senate Finance Committee developed evidence that gross spreads on
foreign bond sales ranged up to 14 percent. See Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States: Hearings Pursuant to S. Rep. No. 19, Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 1356 (1932).
" See, e.g., discussion of Kuhn, Loeb fee and stock options for floating two
Pennroad Corporation stock issues and offering advice, S. Rep. No. 1455, 72d
Cong., 2d Sess. 114-15 (1934); the partially disclosed United Corporation options
received by the Morgan and Bonbright firms discussed in id. at 103, 115, 117, S.
Rep. No. 19, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 1356 (1932). The profits earned by Albert
Wiggin as a result of insiders' information, supra at 204-05; and the profits earned
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1933 and 1934 Federal Securities acts concerning undisclosed
insider or underwriter compensation. In both the 1933160 and
1934161 acts, disclosure provisions publicizing insider conflicts
of interest, self-dealing, waste, or unfair transactions were
emphasized. In the post-1934 period, anecdotal evidence has
been published concerning the prophylactic effect of disclosure
62
on insider self-dealing or conflicts of interest.' More rigorthe effects of discloous findings have been made concerning
163
compensation.
underwriters'
on
sure
Under the current mandatory disclosure system, deterrence of corporate director and officer conflicts of interest is
by favored individuals on J. P. Morgan, Kuhn, Loeb, and National City Company
"preferred lists." S. Rep. No. 1455, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 101-10 (1934).
1" Of the 32 items required to be disclosed by Schedule A of the 1933 Act, 20
explicitly or implicitly concerned insiders' or underwriters' compensation or conflicts
of interest. See Items 4-7, 10, 13-22, 24-25, 27-28, and 30. Securities Act of 1933,
Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74, 88-91 (1933). A similar emphasis on disclosure of
insider compensation appears in the Congressional reports. See, e.g., S. Rep. No.
47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933).
...See §§ 12(b), Items (D)-(H) and 13(a)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b),
78m(a)(2) (1988).
12 See, e.g., SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 51 (1969) (The "Wheat Report"):
The registration process has sometimes been referred to as a housecleaning: One of its most valuable consequences is the elimination of
conflicts of interest and questionable business practices which exposed to
public view, have what Justice Frankfurter once termed "a shrinking
quality." Many illustrations could be given; one representative example is
provided by a paragraph from a recent '33 Act registration statement:
"From time to time during the past three years, certain officers,
directors, and stockholders received loan accommodation from [name of
company], without interest, all of which loans were repaid by September
30, 1968. This practice has been discontinued and such loans will not be
made in the future."
Id. (citation omitted).
1" As far as can be gleaned from available data, the average size of
underwriters' compensation decreased in the two decades before enactment of the
Securities Act of 1933 and afterwards continued to decline for approximately two
decades. Much of this 40-year decline in underwriters' compensation can be attributed to causes other than SEC mandatory disclosures, including the growth in the
size of issues, increased sales to institutions, increased competition among underwriters, and SEC and other competitive bidding requirements.
Nonetheless, several studies of underwriter spreads in the period just before
and just after the Securities Act became operative suggest that the Act's mandatory disclosure of underwriters' compensation was also a factor in the decline in the
size of underwriters' compensation. For a discussion of available data, see 1 LOSS
& SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 215-17.
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most fully addressed in Regulation S-K, Items 401-404.'
These Items identify directors, executive officers, and certain
significant employees, with disclosure of any family relationships or involvement by those persons or promoters and control
persons in specified legal proceedings; 6 require disclosure of
executive compensation; 6 6 indicate security ownership of
management, as well as any person or "group" known to the
registrant to be the beneficial owner of more than five percent
of any class of voting securities and any arrangements that
may result in a change of control of the registrant;'67 and require disclosure of material relationships and transactions
involving management, directors, director nominees, holders of
five percent or more of a class of voting stock, and any member
of the immediate family of any of the persons that may involve
a conflict of interest.'68
Historically, as Marsh implicitly observed, the most controversial of these provisions was Item 402, concerning executive
compensation. Originally adopted in 1942 as a revision to the
proxy rules, 69 Item 402 today requires disclosure of the salary, bonus, and other annual compensation provided to the chief
executive officer and the four most highly compensated executives whose compensation exceeds $100,000; explanations of
stock option, pension, and other specified compensation plans
provided to the same individuals; disclosure of personal benefits or perquisites distributed outside a plan in excess of the
lesser of $50,000 or ten percent of the reported total salary and
bonus; directors' compensation; and compensation arrangements in the event of termination of employment or change of
control arrangements ("golden parachutes").7"
16 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401-.404 (1993).
1

17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (Item 401) (1993).

17
17
16 17
'
In
War II,
'

i'

C.F.R. § 229.402 (Item 402) (1993).
C.F.R. § 229.403 (Item 403) (1993).
C.F.R. § 229.404 (Item 404) (1993).
part, because they were adopted after the United States entered World
the rules were controversial. On their origin, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE

TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 238 (1982).
"' The most recent amendments to Item 402 provide detailed discussion of
these and other items. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,056 (Oct. 16,
1992).
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Item 402 has been amended frequently. During the 1970s,
as an off-shoot of the Commission's investigation into questionable payments,17 ' the Commission filed several complaints
concerning the failure to disclose material management perquisites'72 and, in 1978, ultimately adopted amendments requiring disclosure of specified personal benefits.'73 More recently,
after commentators such as Graef S. Crystal criticized the lack
of any meaningful relationship between certain senior
executives' compensation and their corporations' performance,174 the Commission in 1992 required registrants to
provide "a line graph comparing the registrant's cumulative
total shareholder return with a performance indicator of the
overall stock market and either a published industry index or
registrant-determined peer comparison." 75
The disclosure prophylaxis, however, has not been limited
171 See 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 660-61.
172

See, e.g., SEC v. Sharon Steel Corp., Litigation Release No. 8119, 13 SEC

Docket (CCH) 178 (D.D.C. 1977) (permanent injunction issued as a result of corporate payments over $1.7 million for nonbusiness personal expenses to corporate
chief executive officer and his family); SEC v. Ormand Indus., Litigation Release
96,046, at 96,695
No. 7910, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(D.D.C. May 25, 1977) (permanent injunction issued as a result of unaccounted for
cash advances in excess of $250,000 to corporate officer); SEC v. Charles Jacquin
et Cie, Inc., Litigation Release No. 8164, 13 SEC Docket (CCH) 407 (D.D.C. 1977)
(permanent injunction entered both because of payments to state alcoholic beverage
control officials as inducements to purchase Jacquin products and because of the
diversion of funds to relatives of senior officers of the company). Other cases are
listed in Disclosure of Management Remuneration, Securities Act Release No. 5856,
23,019, at 17,059-*3 n.1
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(Aug. 18, 1977) ("In general, the cases instituted by the Commission have suggested misappropriation of the company's assets in addition to noncompliance with
disclosure provisions.").
17 See Disclosure of Management Background: Uniform Reporting Requirements,
Securities Act Release No. 5758, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
80,783 (Nov. 2, 1976) (comments solicited); Disclosure of Management
(CCI)
Renumeration, Securities Act Release No. 5856, 12 SEC Docket (CCH) 1520 (1977)
(interpretation of earlier management remuneration disclosure requirements); Uniform and Integrated Reporting Requirements: Proposed Amendments to Disclosure
Forms and Regulations, Securities Act Release No. 5950, (1978 Transfer Binder]
81,650 (July 28, 1978); Uniform and Integrated ReportFed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
ing Requirements: Management Remuneration, Securities Act Release No. 6003,
81,765 (Dec. 4, 1978) (adoption).
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
See generally 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 677-78.
IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF
174 GRAEF S. CRYSTAL,
AMERICAN EXECUTIES 96-109 (1991).
175 Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, [1992
85,056 at 83,433-34 (Oct. 16, 1992).
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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to director and officer duty of loyalty concerns. The SEC's Rule
13e-3, 6 promulgated under section 13(e) of the 1934 Act,"'
is directed at "going private" transactions. 7 ' To put Rule 13e3 in context, in 1977 Delaware established that a going private
merger would be permissible only when there was a business
purpose to the transaction' 79 -a position Delaware abandoned in 1983 in favor of a bifurcated fairness standard involving examination of both fair dealing and fair price.8 0 Also in
1977, the Supreme Court aborted a Rule 10b-5 challenge to a
going private transaction that allegedly had no corporate purpose because that Rule did not reach "a breach of fiduciary
duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, misrep-

176 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1993).
177

15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1988).

178 When shareholders of a publicly held corporation are bought out and the

corporation is subsequently not listed on a stock exchange or traded over the
counter, it has "gone private." Often because of the debt borrowed to finance a
buyout, these transactions are called "leveraged buyouts." When the subsequent
owners are corporate insiders, these transactions alternatively are called "management buyouts." When the public shareholders are compelled to accept cash or debt
securities (and hence, among other things, incur a tax), these transactions have
been called "freeze-outs," "squeeze-outs," or "take-outs." See also 5 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 2137-39 n.36, 2144-45 & nn.45-46.
17 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. Intl Gen.
Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
18 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983); see also
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985). Some other
state jurisdictions also hold that there need not be a business purpose when a
going private transaction occurs. See, e.g., Rosenstein v. CMC Real Estate Corp.,
522 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (Wis. law); Yeager v. Paul Semonin Co., 691
S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Sifferle v. Micom Corp., 384 N.W.2d 503 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 797-98 (Ohio
1987); In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 398 A.2d 186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979),
affd, 412 A.2d 1099 (Pa. 1980); see also Schloss Assocs. v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 536 A.2d 147, 157 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
Other state jurisdictions adhere to the requirement of a business purpose
when a going private transaction is challenged. See, e.g., Coggins v. New Eng.
Patriots Football Club, Inc. 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986); see also Bryan v. Brock
& Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (Georgia
law); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1975), affd, 50 A.D.2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't 1976)
(N.Y. blue sky law); but see Perl v. IU Intl Corp., 607 P.2d 1036 (Haw. 1981);
Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1977); Alpert v. 28 William St. Corp.,
63 N.Y.2d 557, 473 N.E.2d 19, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1984); Green v. Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 244, 514 N.E.2d 105, 519 N.Y.S.2d 793, (1987).
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resentation, or nondisclosure." 8 ' The Commission then tried
its hand by way of Rule 13e-3, which it adopted in 1979.182
Presumably because of concerns about the SEC's
rulemaking authority, Rule 13e-3 does not require a valid business purpose. But the Rule has pushed disclosure of the fairness of a going private transaction about as far as it could go.
The Rule requires that a Schedule 13E-3 statement be filed
with the Commission13 and that the content of most of the
statements in response to the items in Schedule 13E-3 be dis8
tributed to security holders." ' Item 8(a) of Schedule 13E-3
requires the issuer or affiliate to state whether it "reasonably
believes that the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair or unfair to
unaffiliated security holders."'85 An instruction adds, "A
statement that the issuer or affiliate has no reasonable belief
as to the fairness of the Rule 13e-3 transaction to unaffiliated
security holders will not be considered sufficient disclosure in
response to Item 8(a)."8 6
Item 8(b) amplifies:
(b) Discuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon
which the belief stated in Item 8(a) is based and, to the extent practicable, the weight assigned to each such factor ....
Instructions. (1) The factors which are important in determining the fairness of a transaction to unaffiliated security holders and
the weight, if any, which should be given to them in a particular
context will vary. Normally such factors will include, among others,
those referred to in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of this Item and
whether the consideration offered to unaffiliated security holders
constitutes fair value in relation to:
(i) Current market prices
(ii) Historical market prices
(iii) Net book value
(iv) Going concern value
(v) Liquidation value
(vi) The purchase price paid in previous purchases disclosed
in Item 1(f) of Schedule 13e-3

Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475 (1977).
...
" Going Private Transactions by Public Companies, Exchange Act Release No.
6100, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979).
Regarding this Rule, see generally 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 2238-47.

'

17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(d)(1) (1993).
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3(e), (f) (1993).
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1993).

"

Id.

1
18
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(vii) Any report, opinion, or appraisal described in Item 9 and
(viii) Firm offers of which the issuer or affiliate is aware made
by any unaffiliated person, other than the person filing
this statement, during the preceding eighteen months for:
(A) the merger or consolidation of the issuer into or with
such person or of such person into or with the issuer,
(B) The sale or other transfer of all or any substantial
part of the assets of the issuer or
(C) Securities of the issuer which would enable the hold
187
er thereof to exercise control of the issuer.

A mere itemization of the factors considered by the issuer
or affiliate in approving a Rule 13e-3 transaction is not adequate in response to Item 8(b).' 88 As the Division of Corporation Finance noted in an interpretative release, "The Division
is concerned that in many instances the Item 8(b) disclosure
being made to security holders is vague and non-specific and is
therefore of limited utility to security holders."'89 The Commission staff takes the position further. When a Rule 13e-3
transaction has different impacts on different groups of unaffiliated security holders, the Item 8 disclosure should include
consideration of the fairness of the transaction to all unaffiliated security holders. This might require, for example, separate
analysis of the fairness of a tender offer or reverse stock split
transaction for security holders who retain their interest in the
company and those who do not. 9 '
In Howing Co. v. Nationwide, Inc., 9' the Sixth Circuit

highlighted the extent to which an issuer or affiliate may rely
on an investment banker's fairness opinion: 92
187

Id.

188 Going

Private Transactions Under Rule 13e-3, Exchange Act Release No.
17,719, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,709, at 17,337 (Apr.
13, 1981) (Question 21).
1
Id. See, e.g., In re Myers Parking Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
26,069, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,333, at 89,498
(Sept. 12, 1988); In re FSC Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 17,892, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,886 (June 25, 1981); In re Tidelands
Capital Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 17,641, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
82,854, at 84,197 (Mar. 19, 1981).
1"8 Going Private Transactions Under Rule 13e-3, supra
note 188, at 17,337.
191 826 F.2d 1470, 1479 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
12 Regarding fairness opinions, see Lucian Anye Bebchuk
& Marcel Kahan,
Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done about It?, 1989
DUKE L.J. 27; William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why
We Should Do Nothing about It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523 (1992); Ted J. Fiflis, Re-
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While the Commission has stated that an issuer in a going
private transaction can rely on an investment banker's opinion to
meet its disclosure obligations, such opinion itself must fully analyze
the factors enumerated in Item 8(b) as well as be "expressly adopted" by the issuer .... The issuer in this case did not conduct its
own investigation but chose to rely on the expertise of First Boston.
The problem with defendants adopting the First Boston opinion
letter as their disclosure to shareholders is that this one-page letter
is itself woefully inadequate when measured against the specific
disclosure requirement of the rule. An issuer cannot insulate itself
from 13e-3 liability by relying on an investment banker's opinion
letter which itself does not comply with the specific disclosure requirements of the Rule. Therefore, defendants' conclusory statements are not cured by conclusory statements made by First Boston
93
in its opinion letter.'

Item 9 of Schedule 13E-3... then requires a summary of
any report, opinion (other than an opinion of counsel), or appraisal from an outside party that is materially related to the
Rule 13e-3 transaction, including any report, opinion, or appraisal relating to the fairness of the consideration to be offered to security holders or the fairness of the transaction to
sponsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497 (1992);
Edward D. Herlihy et al., Disclosure of the Analyses Underlying Investment Banker
Fairness Opinions, 6:3 INSIGHTS at 11 (1992); Dale A. Oesterle, Fairness Opinions
as Magic Pieces of Paper, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 541 (1992); John F. Olson & Mitri J.
Najjar, Fairness for Whom? Fairness Opinions in LBOs and MBOs, 3:8 INSIGHTS
at 27 (1989); Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in
Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119 (1986).
'13 Howing, 826 F.2d at 1479.
In Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991), the court held that the language of Rule 13e-3,
Item 8, created a rebuttable presumption that a discussion of net book value,
going concern value, and liquidation value in a proxy statement was material to
minority shareholders who contemplated a going private offer. This reasoning, the
court said, was "in accord with other courts that have recognized the appropriateness of a 'heightened' TSC materiality standard in coercive securities transactions."
That is to say, "certain facts may be material in the context of a 'one-sided
transaction' which otherwise would not be material in the context of an adversarial transaction." Id. at 266. On the Howing case generally, see Ndira KofeleKale, The SEC's Going-Private Rules-Analysis and Developments, 19 SEC. REG.
L.J. 139 (1991).
"A conclusory statement containing a laundry list' of factors," does not satisfy
the requirement of a board opinion that the offering price is fair. Meyers Parking
Sys., Inc., supra note 129 at 81,498; see also Ndira Kofele-Kale, Some Unfinished
Business, Some Unresolved Issues: Section 13(e) and the SEC's Going Private Rules
after Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 625 (1989).
1- 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1993).
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the issuer to affiliate or to nonaffiliated security holders.'95
2.

Fraud Litigation

To some extent the disclosure of these types of insider or
merging corporation conflicts of interest may tend to deter

duty of loyalty violations. What has been most striking in recent decades, however, has been the extent to which the Commission and private parties have been able to enforce fraud
claims based on undisclosed conflicts of interest that were not
expressly required to be disclosed by Regulation S-K.'96
To a large extent this development can be traced to the
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.,'97 a case best known for its definition of materiality. In TSC, the Court held that two omitted facts relating to another company's [National's] potential influence or
control over the management of TSC were not material as a
matter of law: (1) that the chairman of the TSC board, Stanley
Yarmuth, was National's president and chief executive officer,
and the chairman of the TSC executive committee was Charles
Simonelli, National's executive vice president; and (2) that
neither TSC nor National had indicated that National "may be
deemed to be a 'parent' of TSC as that term is defined in [SEC

1"5 For illustrative violations of this Item, see, e.g., Tidelands Capital Corp.,
supra note 189, at 84,197; Meyers Parking Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
26,069, supra note 189, at 89,497. Cf. Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 252-53 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). See John S. Poole, Management Forecasts. Do They Have A Future in Corporate Takeovers, 42 Sw. L.J. 765 (1988).
In May, 1989 SEC Chairman Ruder proposed extending Rule 13e-3 to thirdparty transactions. "Shareholders should be entitled to disclosures in both affiliated
and nonaffiliated transactions that are sufficiently broad enough to allow them to
judge the fairness of the transaction and the adequacy of the board's efforts to
bring them the best available offer for the corporation." Ruder Supports Extending
LBO Disclosure Rule to Third Parties, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 763 (1989).
Rule 13e-3 currently applies only to transactions between an issuer and its affiliates. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc. v. Schnabel, 593 F. Supp. 1385, 1400 (D.D.C.
1984). A "going private" or "leveraged buyout" transaction that involves both management and a third party is subject to Rule 13e-3. Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
In 1987 there were 633 Schedule 13E-3 statements filed with the Commission.
Arthur M. Borden, A Fresh Look at Going-Private Disclosure, 21 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 73 n.1 (1988).
6 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1993).
197 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933]." 9s
In a footnote the Court nonetheless emphasized that the
total omission of material information concerning a conflict of
section 14(a)
interest, as a matter of law, would
200 have violated
199
14a-9:
Rule
and
of the 1934 Act
We emphasize that we do not intend to imply that facts suggestive of control need be disclosed only if in fact there was control. If,
for example, the proxy statement in this case had failed to reveal
National's 34% stock interest in TSC and the presence of five National nominees on TSC's board, these omissions would have rendered the statement materially misleading as a matter of law, regardless of whether National can be said with certainty to have been
in "control" of TSC. The reasons for this are twofold. First, to the
extent that the existence of control was, at the time of the proxy
statement's issuance, a matter of doubt to those responsible for
preparing the statement, we would be unwilling to resolve that
doubt against disclosure of facts so obviously suggestive of control.
Second, and perhaps more to the point, even if National did not
"control TSC, its stock ownership and position on the TSC board
make it quite clear that it enjoyed some influence over TSC, which
would be of obvious importance to TSC shareholders."'

The lower federal courts subsequently have often required
disclosure of conflicts of interest." 2 In one case, the court ob"

Id. at 451.

19

15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1985) ("It shall be unlawful for any person . . . in con-

travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . .to
solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security . . .registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.").
210 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1993). Rule 14a-9 forbids the solicitation of any proxy
by means of a proxy statement containing a statement that "isfalse and misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact."
Id.
201 Northway, 426 U.S. at 453-54 n.15. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 578
F. Supp. 1041, 1057 (N.D. 111. 1984) ("If the 1973 Proxy actually failed to reveal
Consumers was being merged into its parent in a controlled transaction, that
would undeniably be material."); Edelman v. Salomon, 559 F. Supp. 1178, 1184 (D.
Del. 1983).
See, e.g., Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987, 993-94 (2d Cir.
1988) (in merger between corporations A and B, failure to disclose that general
counsel of corporation A personally represented senior executives of corporation B
and that he and his firm served as counsel to several entities controlled by these
executives constituted material omissions); Kas v. Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc.,
796 F.2d 508, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (-The violation arising from the failure to disclose such a potential conflict of interest does not turn on the failure to disclose a
director's true motivations but rather stems from the failure to disclose a fact that
puts the shareholder on notice of a potential impairment of the director's judge-
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served "a self-dealing insider may have a 'heavier burden of
disclosure' in the sense that he will find it more difficult to
convince the court that he has met the requirements of section
14(a)."203 Once a proxy statement purports to disclose the factors considered by an insider in evaluating the fairness of a
merger, there is an obligation to portray them accurately. °4
Several conflict decisions have concerned stock option plans. In
one such decision, a proxy statement was held to be fraudulent
when it failed to advise stockholders that the board possessed
information to the effect that an imminent tender offer would
increase the value of its stock at the time it had amended its
stock option plan to accelerate the exercise date."'
By 1981 the Ninth Circuit, speaking of the proxy rules
under section 14 of the 1934 Act, drew
a sharp distinction.., between allegations of director misconduct
involving breach of trust or self-dealing-the nondisclosure of which

ment."); Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 719 (11th Cir. 1983); TBK Partners v.
Shaw, 689 F. Supp. 693, 698-701 (W.D. Ky. 1988); Hahn v. Breed, 587 F. Supp.
1369, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Dofflemyer v. W. F. Hall Printing Co., 558 F. Supp.
372, 382-83 (D. Del. 1983) (rejecting defendants' motion to dismiss); SEC v. WorldWide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 757 (N.D. Ga. 1983); SEC v. Falstaff
Brewing Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,117, at
92,022 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1977).
For Rule 10b-5 purposes, a registered investment adviser is a fiduciary and,
therefore has an affirmative duty to disclose "all possible conflicts of interest."
Laird v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 897 F.2d 826, 835 (5th Cir. 1990); see also
Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 777 (2d Cir. 1991) ("That inside directors stand to gain from a recommended transaction is material information that
must be disclosed to shareholders considering a tender offer.").
' Pavlidis v. New Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1st
Cir. 1984); see also Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1544
(E.D. Mich. 1986).
' Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 489, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
('The drafters of the proxy statement could not legitimately attribute to Casey
factors which he did not actually consider, thereby making his decision appear
well-informed, and then shield themselves by arguing that Casey's subjective motivations are not material."). This type of analysis is consistent with the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct.
2749 (1991).
' Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 797 (2d Cir. 1979). The board also did
not disclose an amendment to the plan permitting shares to be purchased on a
loan basis in place of the prior cash-only requirement. Id.
The manner in which the total compensation package was disclosed in
Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 849-52 (N.D. Ohio 1983), was held to be materially false and misleading. Cf. Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365, 378-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1292-96 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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is presumably material-and allegations of simple breach of fiduciary duty/waste of corporate assets-the nondisclosure of which is
206
never material for § 14(a) purposes ....

While subsequent commentators 2 7 and cases 2 8 have
questioned whether the ambit of federal securities law fraud
enforcement should be limited to nondisclosure of possible duty
of loyalty violations or should also reach questionable payments made on behalf of the corporation, there is today no
significant question that undisclosed insider or merging corporation conflicts of interest both can be fraudulent and material.
H. THE DUTY OF CARE
The process of augmenting or displacing traditional state
corporate law is even more advanced in the area I now want to
discuss, the duty of care. In corporate law, the duty of care is
the basic negligence concept. Directors and officers, according
to leading cases such as Francis v. United Jersey Bank,20 9
must "discharge their duties in good faith and with that degree
of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent [persons]
would exercise under similar circumstances in like posi-

v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 776-79 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1145 (1982). But cf. Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987);
Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 115-19 (2d Cir. 1982).
' See Bevis Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity, 38 Bus. LAw. 1413 (1983). The Gaines opinion, he says, "seems to rest on the
rather cynical assumption that shareholders, in exercising their rights of corporate
suffrage, care plenty about a management that is stealing from the company, but
are concerned not a whit about a management that is stealing for the company."
Id. at 1418; see also George S. Branch & James A. Rubright, Integrity of Management Disclosures under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 1447, 1478-79
(1982); Michael G. Michaelson, "Breach of Trust": The Duty to Disclose Pending
Litigation in a Contest for Corporate Control, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1984); Dennis
J. Block et al., Judicial Limitations on Federal Disclosure Requirements Regarding
208 Gaines

Management Integrity, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 354 (1987).
2 8 In Roeder, the First circuit stated that "[m]anagement's willingness to engage in practices that probably or obviously are illegal, and its decision to put the
corporation at risk by so doing, may be critically important factors to investors."
814 F.2d at 25; see also Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650, 655
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); Shields v. Erikson, [1989-1990
Aug. 23,
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %94,723 at 93,904-05 (N.D. Ill.

1989).
209

432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
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tions."2 10 When, say, a director fails to acquire a rudimentary

understanding of the business of a corporation, to keep informed of its activities, or to monitor adequately corporate
affairs and policies and this failure is the proximate cause of
(or, at least a substantial factor contributing to) a loss, the
director can be held liable for a failure to supervise the corporation. Typically this lesson is embellished by observing that
directors normally may rely on the reports of officers, committees, and outsiders such as the certified public accountant,'
and that, in many instances, a director can be held liable for a
failure to supervise only when the circumstances provide notice
that something may be amiss.2 12 As a famous Delaware case
put it, "there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing
which they have no reason to suspect exists."2 3
Enter now the voracious exceptions. When directors actually do make a decision, that decision normally will be insulated from judicial review by the business judgment rule, which
in essence applies as long as the directors were both untainted
by a conflict of interest and adequately informed.214 In the
leading corporate law jurisdiction for publicly traded corporations (Delaware), "the concept of gross negligence is ... the
proper standard for determining whether a business judgment
reached by a board of directors was an informed one."2" 5 Delaware goes further. A corporation can amend its certificate of
incorporation to preclude the personal liability of any director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
the director's negligence or gross negligence.1 ' And, even if a
Delaware corporation does not go so far, most plaintiffs' complaints raising duty of care cases are dismissed under the
same litigation committee and kindred procedures I earlier

2. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14 (West 1969 & Supp. 1993)).
211

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 141(e) (1991).

See, e.g., Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
213Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
214 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); supra
212

note 23 and accompanying text.
21' Id. at 873. For circumstances that can lead to a holding that directors made
an uninformed decision, see also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988).
216 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
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discussed in the duty of loyalty context."'
Let me compare more dynamic federal securities law developments in this area. The SEC has authority to regulate
both accounting standard-setting and, probably, auditing as
well.2 18 The distinction between accounting and auditing was
described by an ad hoc Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities in these terms:
In the broadest sense, the discipline of accounting includes
auditing. However, accounting can be described as measuring and
reporting the effects of economic activities of individual entities.
Auditing, on the other hand, involves an independent examination
to determine the propriety of accounting processes, measurements,
and communication. Stated simply, the accountant prepares finan9
cial information; the auditor checks it."

The Commission first became seriously concerned with
auditing after its 1940 investigation of McKesson & Robbins."' In that case an annual audit by a reputable firm of
accountants did not prevent the senior officers of the company

from siphoning away several millions in cash, primarily by
overstating its inventory and accounts receivable by approximately $20 million and reporting large profits from a wholly
fictitious crude drug business.22 ' Beginning in the 1970s with
See supra note 83-145 and accompanying text.
authority derives from § 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
77s(a) (1988), which empowers the Commission to prescribe "the methods to be
217

218 This

§

followed in the preparation of reports . . . ". See also

§

13(b) of the 1934 Act, 15

U.S.C. 78m(b) (1988) ("preparation of reports"); Sched. A (25),(26) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25),(26) (1988); § 12(b)(1)(J) of 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
781(bX1)(K) (1988). From the fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, see
especially §§ 11, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77q (1988); §§ 18(a), 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78r(a) (1988). For authority under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, see § 30(e), 15 U.S.C. 80a-29(e) (1988); under the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, see § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 79n (1988).
"' COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES,

REPORT,

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS xii (1978).
22
SEC, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF McKESSON & ROBBINS, INC.: REPORT ON INVESTI-

GATION (reprint 1982) (1940) [hereinafter MATTER OF MCKESSON]. For summaries
of the report, and of action with respect to auditing procedures taken by professional societies after the disclosures of the investigation, see id. at 4-12, 361-70; In
re McKesson & Robbins, Inc.-Summary of Findings and Conclusions, Acct. Ser. Rel.
19, 1940 WL 977 (1940); see also 5 SEC Ann. Rep. 110-11, 119-20 (1939); 6 MATTER OF MCKESSON, supra, 155, 164-69 (1940).
"i For further discussion of the McKesson & Robbins and other leading audit
failures, see generally 2 LosS & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 715-25.
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such cases as the criminal conviction of the auditors involved

in the Equity Funding fraud222 and with the Commission's
questionable payment or overseas bribery enforcement actions,' attention again was focused on the problem of "audit
failures."
Besides continuing with enforcement actions against auditors, the Commission mounted a two-pronged response during
the 1970s to the problem of audit failures. First, in 1977 the
Commission approved a rule change in the listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange, requiring each domestic company with common stock listed on that exchange,
as a condition of initial and continued listing of its securities... to

establish not later than June 30, 1978, and maintain thereafter an
audit committee composed solely of directors independent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of the
board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent
judgment as a committee member." 4

This was a salutary, if modest, reform. On March 11, 1976,
when SEC Chairman Roderick Hills requested that the NYSE
make this amendment to its listing requirements, he estimated
that almost 90 percent of the nation's largest corporations
already had established audit committees. 5 A 1980 SEC
survey of 1,200 business corporations whose securities were
publicly traded found that the typical audit committee met 2.7
times per year and limited its functions to approving the selection of the firm's outside auditor and reviewing its audit plans
and results.2'
2
United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Seidman &
Seidman, Accounting Series Release No. 196, [1927-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.

L. Rep. (CCH)

72,128, at 62,527 (Sept. 1, 1976). ("By the time the massive

fraud was disclosed, Equity had in excess of $120 million (net of deferred taxes) in
fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets on its books.").
223 See 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 660-61.
' In re New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 11
SEC Docket (CCH) 1945 (1977).
' Roderick Hills, Addresses of June 21, 1976 and June 30, 1976, summarized
in JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECuRITIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 547
(1982).
226 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, SEC, 96TH CONG.,
2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF
RULES RELATING TO SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION
IN THE CORPORATE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY
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More significantly, at approximately the same time the
Commission persuaded Congress to enact the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. It added section 13(b)(2) to the 1934 Act, which
requires each reporting corporation to "devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances that ... transactions are recorded as
necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles ..... ' A primary purpose of section 13(b)(2) was to
prevent corporate officers or directors from making materially
false or misleading statements or omitting to state material
facts "to an accountant in connection with (1) any audit or
examination of the financial statements of the issuer.., or (2)
the preparation or filing of any document or report required to
be filed with the Commission. . . ."" As the first litigated
section 13(b)(2) decision explained:
It is clear that section 13(b)(2) and the rules promulgated
thereunder are rules of general application which were enacted to
(1) assure that an issuer's books and records accurately and fairly
reflect its transactions and the disposition of assets, (2) protect the
integrity of the independent audit of issuer financial statements that
are required under the Exchange Act, and (3) promote the reliability
and completeness of financial information that issuers are required
to file with the Commission or disseminate to investors pursuant to
the Exchange Act.'

496-506, 608 (Comm. Print 1980).
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988). For citations concerning this Act, see
2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 696 n.223.
In 1988 Congress adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments,
which added §§ 13(b)(4)-(7). See H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 916-17
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1415. These Sections, among other things,
limit criminal liability to persons who knowingly violate § 13(b)(2); and define the
terms reasonable assurances and reasonable detail to mean "such level of detail
and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their
own affairs."
Rule 13b2-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b) (1993).
SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 747 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
For illustrative SEC proceedings, see In re Sweeney, Exchange Act Release No.
24,888, 39 SEC Docket (CCH) 160 (1987). In re De Laurentis Entertainment
Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 24,786, 38 SEC Docket (CCH) 1343 (1987);
In re Citizens Trust Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,802, [1982-87 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 73,484 (Jan. 15, 1986); In re Tonka Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 22,448, [1982-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,473 (Sept. 24, 1985); In re Burroughs Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
73,450 (Mar. 20,
21,872, [1982-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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Violations of section 13(b) and the other SEC auditing
provisions are essentially failures of the outside auditor or the
corporate registrant to exercise due care. Let me offer an illustration. In 1992, the Commission brought a disciplinary action
against two certified public accountants, John R. Schoemer and
Michael P. Denkensohn for alleged misconduct in their audit of
the December 31, 1983, consolidated financial statements of
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. (MMC).23 ° The
Commission's summary of the proceeding reads like a paraphrase of the duty of care:
The Commission concludes that Respondents did not examine
MMC's 1983 consolidated financial statements in accordance with
GAAS [Generally Accepted Auditing Standards] in that they (1)
failed to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to afford a
reasonable basis for the opinion on those financial statements; and

1985); see also In re Komm, Exchange Act Release No. 25,354, [1987-91 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 73,644 (Jan. 11, 1988) (chief financial officer
violated Rule 13b-2 when he falsified books, records, and accounts concerning disposition of automated teller machines); In re Maury, Exchange Act Release No.
23,067, [1982-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,413 (Mar. 26,
1986) (company controller who was highest ranking accounting employee, though
not a decisionmaker, had a duty to the company and its stockholders not to assist,
or even acquiesce in, false financial statements).
Even before enactment of § 13(b)(2), the Commission emphasized in enforcement actions the need for a registrant to maintain an adequate system of internal
controls. See, e.g., In re S. D. Leidesdorf & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 13,268,
[1977-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,231, at 62,578 (Feb. 8,
1977) ("Independent auditors should carefully test and evaluate the internal control
systems of an audit client before placing any reliance upon those controls."); In re
Drayer-Hanson, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 3277, [1977-82 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 72,082, at 62,165 (Mar. 15, 1948) ("the auditors should
have made a more thorough examination of the registrant's system of internal
control and . . . should have determined they were being operated effectively"); see
also SEC v. Gemcraft, Litigation Release No. 11,170, 36 SEC Docket (CCH) 264
(S.D. Tex. 1986); In re Harrison, Exchange Act Release No. 22,466 (1982-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %73,474 (Sept. 26, 1985); In re Frederick S. Todman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 21,258, [1982-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,436 (Aug. 20, 1984); In re Murphy, Hauser,
O'Connor & Quinn, Exchange Act Release No. 20,465, [1982-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,418 (Dec. 9, 1983); In re Goldberg, Exchange Act
Release No. 20,209, [1982-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,413
(Sept. 22, 1983).
No private right of action is available under §13(b). See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991);
McLean v. International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987).
n' In re John R. Schoemer, C.P.A., Exchange Act Release No. 30,535, 51 SEC
Docket (CCI) 158 (1992).
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(2) failed to exercise due professional care in performing the audit.
Standard of Field Work No. 3 of GAAS states: "Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for
an opinion regarding the financial statements under audit." The
Commission finds that the evidence obtained by Respondents during
the course of the 1983 audit of MMC's consolidated financial statements was insufficient to afford a reasonable basis for their opinion
that MMC's method of recording the existence, completeness and
value of certain of its investments was proper. As discussed below,
the Commission finds that Respondents did not obtain competent
evidence concerning the nature and extent of the investment activities of MMC's investment unit, the Investment Management Group
("IMG"), when various other audit steps likely would have produced
the necessary information.
General Standard No. 3 of GAAS states: "Due professional care
is to be exercised in the performance of the audit and the preparation of the report." The Commission finds that Respondents did not
conduct their audit with due professional care in that, having made
the decision to perform substantive testing of the company's investment portfolio accounts within the IMG, they failed to follow established audit procedures to test that (a) securities recorded in the
investment portfolio accounts existed at the balance sheet date; (b)
all securities that should have been recorded were in fact recorded
in the investment portfolio accounts; (c) securities were properly
valued in accordance with GAAP; and (d) all liabilities related to the
securities were recorded in the financial statements.23 '

What distinguishes Commission audit failure proceedings
from state corporate law duty of care activities, however, is not
merely that they focus on financial auditing, but also the variety of remedies the SEC can employ and the frequency with
which the agency brings actions. At the current time the Commission, in essence, can invoke five different types of remedies:
(1) Judicial injunctions under, among other provisions,
section 21(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act; 2
(2) Disciplinary actions against accountants under Rule
2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice;2
(3) Disciplinary proceedings against the corporate registrant under section 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange

21

Id. at 159-60.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988). Regarding Commission injunctive proceedings, see

generally, 10 Loss & SELIGATAN, supra note 3, at 4661-83.
2'
17 C.F.R. § 201.2e (1993). Regarding Rule 2(e) proceedings, see generally 10
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 4799-812.
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4

(4) Administrative cease and desist proceedings against
either the accountant or the registrant; 215 or

(5) References to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution."
The frequency with which SEC accounting proceedings has
been brought dwarfs state corporate law duty of care proceedings. Since 1970, for example, there have been over 120 Rule
2(e) proceedings brought against accountants;2 7 and, of the
60 section 15(c)(4) proceedings brought between 1975 and June
1985, 46 were said to have concerned accounting and financial
disclosuresY Similar totals have already begun to develop
for accounting violations under the Commission's cease and
desist powers, which were only adopted in 1990. 9 In contrast Professor Joseph Bishop observed in 1968 about the state
corporate law duty of care that

15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1988); see 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 18981902.
2 See 10 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 4911-914. There are also civil
fines and bar orders that can be imposed. See id. at 4906-10, 4914-15.
236 See 10 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 4684-716. Leading criminal accounting fraud cases include United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); United States v. White, 124 F.2d
181 (2d Cir. 1941).
23 In Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second
Circuit upheld Rule 2(e) as applied to accountants as "a necessary adjunct to the
Commission's power to protect the integrity of its administrative procedures and
the public in general." Regarding the greater than 120 Rule 2(e) proceedings, see
citations in 10 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, ch. 13.A(3) (forthcoming 1993).
' William R. McLucas & Laurie Romanowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings
Under Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 145,
152 (1985).
. See, e.g., In re Abington Bancorp, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,614,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,837 (Apr. 22, 1992) (also internal accounting controls); In re Caterpiller Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,830 (Mar. 31, 1992) (Item 303 of Reg. S-K); In re
Amre, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,431, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,823 (Mar. 2, 1992) (also internal accounting controls); In re Richard D.
Lemmerman, Exchange Act Release No. 29,737, [1987-91 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,789 (Sept. 26, 1991); In re Excel Bancorp, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 29,675, [1987-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,785 (Sept. 11, 1991) (same); In re Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 29,557, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,146, at
90,814 (Aug. 14, 1991) (also internal accounting controls).
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[t]he search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations
have been held liable.., for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large
haystack. Few are the cases in which the stockholders do not allege
conflict of interest, still fewer those among them which achieve even
such partial success as denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss
4
the complaint."

Twenty-five years later Bishop's words still ring true. Bishop
identified only four cases in which directors of industrial corporations had been held potentially liable for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing. The 1992 American Law Institute
Principles of Corporate Governance Proposed Final Draft cited
only three cases as examples of "negligent liability."2 4'
Recently in several individual months, private plaintiffs
have filed at least that many duty of care cases, employing the
federal securities laws. For a failure to disclose a duty of care
violation can be fraud, a point, for example, implied by
Delaware's supreme court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.242
Most of these private federal securities fraud cases are
based on misrepresentations or omissions in a corporation's
financial statements. For example, in recent years, a substantial number of lawsuits have alleged that corporations made
projections or forward looking statements of such matters as
future earnings "without a reasonable basis."243 Other cases
have involved such cognate areas as bank loan loss reserves, 24 pending legal proceedings4 5 or trends or uncer-

2
Joseph Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of Corporate Officers and Directors, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968).
24

Cf. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 16, § 4.01, at 210.
488 A.2d 858, 890-92 (Del. 1985).

24 Rule 175(a) of the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (1993). For discussion of the SEC's policy on projections, including citations to the literature and

leading cases, see 2 LOSS &

SELIGMAN,

supra note 3, at 622-36 (1989 & Supp.

1992).
24 See, e.g., Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 365 (1992); In re First Chicago Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 24,567,
[1987-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 73,603 (June 10, 1987).
2" See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir.
1989) (unclean power plant approval proceeding); Levine v. NL Indus., Inc., 926
F.2d 199, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1991) (Regulation S-K Item 101(c)(1)(xii) requires disclosure of both the cost of complying with environmental regulations and potential
costs for failing to comply); cf. In re United States Steel Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 16,223, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 82,319
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tainties concerning liquidity, capital resources and income that
the SEC requires corporate registrants to disclose in the Man246
agement Discussion and Analysis Item of Regulation S-K.
A duty of care suit can also arise under the federal securities laws for such "plain vanilla" accounting misconduct as
inventory deficiency fraud,24 7 improper income recognition"8
or improper accounting for goodwill.2 49 Moreover the Commission can also bring fraud actions directly against the corporation for material misrepresentations or omissions in the nonfinancial parts of required filings. Currently Regulation S-K
specifies narrative disclosure of such disparate topics as:
Item 101:
Description of a corporation's business (including information about financial segments);25
m
Item 102:
Description of its property;"
Items 201-02: Securities of the corporation; 252 or
Item 503(c):
Risk factors in a new securities issuance."
Indeed the practical consequence of requiring large publicly
held corporations to comply with the SEC's Regulations S-K
and S-X both in their mandatory periodic disclosures to share-

(Sept. 27, 1979) (corporation was found to have failed to disclose between 1973
and 1977 the material effects that compliance with environmental laws would have
on capital expenditures and earnings and failed to disclose a series of pending or
contemplated environmental administrative proceedings when it stated in its flings, "U.S. Steel had pledged to confront and resolve its environmental problems
as effectively and efficiently as technology, time and money permit"). See generally
2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 649-62 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (concerning
general responsibilities for pending legal proceedings).
' Regulation S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1993); see, e.g., In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, [1982-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
73,830 (Mar. 31, 1982). For discussion and citations to literature
and leading cases, see generally 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 669-72
(1989 & Supp. 1992).
27 See, e.g., Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 432-35 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); cf. In re Burroughs Corp., Exchange Act
Release No. 21,872, 32 SEC Docket (CCH) 935 (1985).
' See, e.g., United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 439
U.S. 824 (1978).
24 See, e.g., Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
2' See 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 639-46.
2" Id. at 647-49.
252 Id. at 662-64.
2' Id. at 678-82.
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holders and the Commission and when they issue new securities to the public is largely to transform concern with the duty
of care from a highly episodic involvement for a small number
of corporations in state fiduciary litigation to an ongoing compliance responsibility of all corporations subject to SEC jurisdiction.
Supreme Court decisions such as Santa Fe v. Green,'
which in 1977 aborted a Rule 10b-5 challenge to a going private transaction, because that Rule did not reach "a breach of
fiduciary duty by majority shareholders, without any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, " "' may suggest
that fraud is something fundamentally different than fiduciary
duty violations. This is an error corporate law practitioners
don't tend to make. When a business corporation misstates
either the text or numbers in its financial statements (in the
absence of a conflict of interest), this is typically viewed as
fraud based on a form of negligence. In some instances there
will be a pleading requirement that the plaintiff assert that at
least severe recklessness was involved.256 But as the SEC's
safe harbor rule for projections1 7 with its reference to "reasonable basis" well illustrates, recklessness is not invariably a
prerequisite for a securities fraud claim." A private action
can be successfully litigated against an accountant involved in
the preparation of a registration statement under section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933 when the accountant is unable to
carry a "due diligence" (or, duty of care) defense." 9 Similarly
when the SEC brings fraud actions against accountants under
sections 17(a)(2) or (3) of the same Act, the Commission only
has to prove the equivalent of negligence, rather than scienter."0 To be sure, actions against accountants under Rule
14a-926 and aiding and abetting claims against accountants

430 U.S. 462 (1977).

Id. at 476.
See 8 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 3665-67 n.521.
Rule 175 of the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1993) and Rule 3(b)-6 of the
1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1993).
2
See 8 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 3653-77.
= See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
2" See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 4479-88, 4487-88 n.66; see also
supra note 200.
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under Rule 10b-5262 require at least reckless misconduct. But
the difference between negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness is one of degree. The key is that securities fraud
claims, in fact, are often based on conduct that is the equivalent to a state law fiduciary duty violation regardless of the
formal pleading requirements of a federal securities law cause
of action.
III. A PROPOSAL
These federal securities law developments leave the duties
of loyalty and care in an awkward state. While the federal
securities laws, for example, have expanded the necessity for
corporations to disclose material conflicts of interest, these
same federal laws provide no remedy when there has been full
disclosure of a conflict and an unfair transaction. At that point
enforcement is solely a matter of state law. But the states in
recent years have increasingly erected barriers to derivative
claims challenging duty of loyalty violations in publicly traded
corporations. Federal and state laws, therefore, appear to be
moving in opposite directions.
Against this background, if Congress chose to act it would
have a choice. Congress, for example, could adopt a regulatory
conflict of interest provision along the lines suggested by Harold Marsh263 or a more limited litigation approach.
While I sympathize with the end sought by Marsh, I doubt
that a general regulatory approach would be wise. Either it
would be limited to officer and director conflicts of interest, in
which case it would exclude important categories of duty of
loyalty violations such as those involved in parent-subsidiary
mergers, or more broadly it would have to address potential
conflicts of interest generally. If the more general approach
were pursued, Congress would be enacting exactly the type of
"merit" regulation that it eschewed in adopting the Securities
Act of 1933."

'

Ironically while merit regulation is often de-

Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
See Marsh, supra note 5, at 74-5.
Regarding merit regulation, see 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 109-
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rided as heavy-handed or bureaucratic, the difficulty with a
preemptive review of potential conflict transactions is that it
might tend to give an agency blessing to transactions that
when completed may raise substantial questions of fairness.
Perhaps the risk of premature regulatory approval of potential
interested transactions can be fully obviated through skillful
statutory or rule drafting or skillful administration. Nonetheless the potential delays and costs for those engaged in merger
or similar types of transactions persuades me that a less intrusive, ex post approach is preferable.
In 1974, former SEC Chairman and then Columbia Law
School Professor William Cary, troubled by Delaware's role in
the deterioration of state corporate law standards, proposed a
Federal Corporate Uniformity Act." 5 More recently I have
endorsed an amplification of this idea.26 The essence of
Cary's proposal was that Congress should preempt state corporate law norms only when a compelling need for a limited
intervention can be shown. This limited type. 7 of approach is
particularly appropriate in a country with our long history of
state corporate law standards. One area today where sufficient
evidence has accumulated to justify possible congressional
action would be the duties of loyalty and care. I would urge
that this examination be limited to only the largest of the
publicly traded corporations; for example, those otherwise
subject
to SEC jurisdiction under section 12 of the 1934
268
Act.
The federal fiduciary duty cause of action Congress could
enact would be litigated in federal court and would expressly
prohibit federal courts from deferring to special litigation committees in suits properly alleging the misconduct of any mem-

See Cary, supra note 154, at 701.
See Seligman, supra note 143, at 947.
William Quillen, in an accompanying response, emphasizes the last few pages
of my Article in which I recommend that Congress consider a limited preemption
of state fiduciary duty law for corporations subject to § 12 of the 1934 Act. See
Quillen, supra note 96, at 123 n.80. I have no interest in writing a detailed reply
to his response, but I will observe that while I did co-write a proposal for federal
chartering in 1976 with Ralph Nader and Mark Green, my current article relies
solely on the more limited proposal contained in my 1990 article in the Maryland
Law Review, supra note 155.
7 See Cary, supra note 154, at 701.
" For discussion of § 12, see 4 LoSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 1733-73.
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ber of the board of directors. The federal fiduciary standard
should substitute for the special litigation committee the federal courts' standards for dismissal of nonmeritorious suits." 9
The new standard will pose some difficult drafting problems.
For instance, how should Congress respond to those states that
currently permit a corporation to "opt out" of duty of care liability?.. And, what if these same states went further and
permitted corporations to opt out of duty of loyalty liabilities or
capped duty of loyalty damages? These types of issues might
be resolved by the adoption of language such as that contained
in section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, prohibiting the enforcement of
state or private conditions, stipulations, or provisions binding
any person to waive or limit compliance with the newly adopted federal fiduciary duties.
The substance of the standards will also require considerable thought. Should Congress adopt as its duty of care standard a gross negligence standard such as that in Delaware,
language similar to the definition of reasonableness in section
11(c) of the Securities Act" 1 or another formulation? Congress has already had some experience in making these types
of judgments, for example, in section 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act. 2 This is both a manageable and conventional
drafting problem. At the same time it is likely that if Congress
does address the need for new federal fiduciary duty standards, it will examine other topics as well. I do not believe that
this should be a one-sided inquiry. There may also be a need,
as I have suggested elsewhere,2 "' to examine applicable discovery and joinder rules to see if it is possible to design a new
federal approach that more effectively deters duty of loyalty
violations yet can do so at a lower transaction cost to the corporations that foot the bill for derivative litigation.
In sum, I believe we have reached a point where Congress
should consider buttressing the state law duties of loyalty and
care with concurrent federal legislation. The appropriate legis-

See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 12, 56.
2,o DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988).
26

271

15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1988).
Seligman, supra note 143, at 403.
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lation, however, should not fully preempt state law and should
be no broader than its demonstrated need.

